

THE

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AUGUST 1971

# PROGRESSIVE

## WHAT WE KNOW NOW

ERWIN KNOLL

## CHINA'S STRATEGIC SHIFT

O. EDMUND CLUBB

## THE ABANDONED CITIES

JAMES B. STEELE

## CLOUT IN COMMON CAUSE?

WILLIAM B. CHAPMAN

# office memo

RECENTLY we received a letter from Martin Dibner of Maine, in which he gave an unusual reason for not renewing his subscription. He found *The Progressive* so interesting, he explained, that if he did not stop reading it he would never get around to writing another novel. He added a line of greeting to Associate Editor Arnold Serwer; the two had been boyhood friends in Brooklyn but had not been in touch since.

Arnold assured Mr. Dibner that he understood how *The Progressive* could keep him from producing another novel and recalled the punchball games they had played years ago. Mr. Dibner responded by renewing his subscription after all and sending our Associate Editor a copy of his sixth novel, *The Trouble with Heroes*, which Doubleday published this year. He inscribed it: "To a pretty good punchball player from the best immie player on the block." An "immie" is a large glass marble, and a "pretty good punchball player," in the old days, was one who hit about .300. Our Associate Editor believes he was a better hitter than that, but time puts a rosy hue on nearly everything.

Back in the book review pages this month, *Inside: Prison American Style* is reviewed by an insider, Mel Phillips of the Missouri state penitentiary and its librarian. Lewis Welker, the prison's education director, told us that inmate Phillips "would like to waive any payment because *The Progressive* is non-profit and has done much to aid our library through donation of books and the granting of a complimentary subscription." Mr. Welker did suggest that we mention, "should space be available," that "readers could donate books of all types" to the prison library. The address: Lewis Welker, Education Director, Missouri Training Center for Men, Moberly, Missouri 65270.

Readers may recall that we reported on Mr. Welker's informal survey of some prisoners' response to *The Progressive* in the October, 1970 issue's Office Memo. When we asked Mr. Welker to suggest inmates' fields of special interest in books, we expected to hear (as we did) criminology and law and civil rights but were surprised to note his inclusion of graphic arts, music, and business, along with biography, politics, and modern history.

Sixteen years ago, this classified advertisement appeared in the February, 1955 issue: "May I find the book you want? Marcia Haskells, 122 S. 3rd Avenue, Mount Vernon, New York." Last month, 197 issues later, the advertisement, virtually unchanged, made its final appearance in these pages.

Marcia Haskells, a loyal advertiser, died on June 12. Her sister, Phyllis Collier, wrote to us: "She was quite a character. She had an intuitive ability to find books. *The Progressive* was the one publication she depended on."

## The PROGRESSIVE

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# The PROGRESSIVE

"YOU SHALL KNOW THE TRUTH

AND THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE"

## *The Price of Secrecy*

AT A Congressional conference on war crimes held in Washington a year and a half ago, political scientist Hans Morgenthau called on his fellow citizens to "pay tribute to that small but courageous number of the American armed forces who have refused over the years to follow orders when it came to the indiscriminate killing of civilians." Such men, he said, "are heroes whom we ought to remember and honor—not only for their own sake, but because they provide us with an example of what individual conscience can do against the immorality of an act of government."

Daniel Ellsberg, the former Pentagon war planner who arranged for disclosure of the Government's secret history of American involvement in Vietnam, is that kind of hero. He knew when he embarked on his course of conscience that he was jeopardizing not only his brilliant career but his personal liberty. He knew that many of his former associates and friends, as well as millions of Americans whom he had never met, would regard his act of patriotism as an act of treason. He knew, nonetheless, that his first obligation was to make the truth known to the American people.

As it happens, Ellsberg was also a participant in that Congressional conference on war crimes, and he made this comment in the course of its deliberations: "Individual acts of initiative and courage cannot, of course, bear the burden of preventing catastrophes like Vietnam. Institutional

and political changes are essential. Yet even if these changes do occur, I believe that we cannot avoid much, much worse war crimes and horrors than we have seen in the past unless many individuals within the Government do assume greater risks and a greater sense of responsibility than has been shown in the past decade."

As we ponder the record of arrogance, duplicity, and deceit that emerges from the Pentagon Papers

and wonder how we can best put our new knowledge to use so that our nation and the world will gain *something* from America's catastrophic Indochina adventure, it occurs to us that our first obligation is to Daniel Ellsberg and those "many individuals within the Government" to whom he referred. We are certain that there are men now serving the Government who possess, at least potentially, the courage and integrity he has displayed. We are equally convinced that crimes of the kind he exposed are even now being planned and perpetrated in our names. It is our duty, therefore, to demonstrate to these individuals that we, as citizens, will accept their acts of courageous dissent with gratitude and not with scorn or indifference—that we will, as Hans Morgenthau suggested, "remember and honor" them for their "example of what individual conscience can do."

Our second obligation, it seems to us, is to encourage and protect the free press that has served the people of the United States so admirably in recent weeks. It is all too true that much of the Vietnam record that has unfolded so dramatically since *The New York Times* published the first installment of its series on the Pentagon Papers on June 13 should have been exposed long ago by a press with the imagination and initiative to ferret out the facts without dependence on official documents. But the disclosure, however tardy, makes it plain that the role of the press in our society and its rela-



Herblock in The Washington Post

**"Can you be sure that publication of those Papers won't somehow some way result in casualties?"**



tionship to our power elites is far more complex than is usually suggested either in simplistic and paranoid radical analyses of a "kept press" or in publishers' self-congratulatory bombast.

It is a fact that the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press remains our strongest safeguard against authoritarian repression and our most effective device for promoting democratic change. It is precisely for this reason that freedom of the press is under relentless official attack, and that Administration spokesmen, led by the Vice President, have worked so hard to discredit the media with the public.

No one should draw undue comfort from the fact that the Government's attempts to suppress publication of the Pentagon Papers were thwarted by the Supreme Court. Indeed, the episode provided disturbing evidence that the First Amendment is in serious jeopardy. For the first time in the history of the Republic, the Government succeeded, at least temporarily, in enjoining newspapers from publishing the news. And even as this effort was being overturned by a six-to-three decision of the Supreme Court, the Court gave distressing testimony that its own commitment to the First Amendment can no longer be taken for granted.

Only the two senior members of the Court, Justice Hugo L. Black and Justice William O. Douglas, affirmed their unequivocal and unswerving devotion to the constitutional principle of freedom of the press. In varying degrees, the other seven justices all implied that there might be circumstances in which they would assign the Government's wishes precedence over the people's rights.

At the "liberal" end of the Court's spectrum, Justice Thurgood Marshall saw "some situations"—unspecified—in which the First Amendment might not prevail. At the "conservative" end, Justice Harry Blackmun, President Nixon's most recent appointee, cavalierly dismissed the First Amendment as, "after all, only one part of an entire Constitution." The Chief Justice of the United States, Warren E. Burger, advised the press that it ought

to consult with the Administration on what it should and should not print. And two justices who voted with the majority, Byron L. White and Potter Stewart, invited the Government to institute criminal proceedings for disclosure of the Pentagon Papers and served notice, in effect, that they would vote to sustain ensuing convictions.

The opinions of most of the justices thus suggested that when the First Amendment is subjected to its next crucial test, it may not fare so well. When the Court had handed down its judgment, the Solicitor General of the United States remarked, "Maybe the newspapers will show a little restraint in the future." We hope they will do otherwise. It is our duty to help the press resist Government pressure—to encourage it not to exercise more restraint but more initiative and independence.

As for the "institutional and political changes" that Ellsberg mentioned, our next obligation is to mount a full-scale attack on the monstrous system of official secrecy which shields the American people from knowledge of the momentous decisions being made in their name. Under the guise of "national security," vast areas of the public's business—including virtually the entire scope of military and foreign affairs—have been removed from public scrutiny.



Horst in Cologne Express

One Step After Another

In the Defense Department alone, six million cubic feet of filing space are crammed with about twenty million classified documents—including newspaper clippings stamped TOP SECRET and "sensitive" papers pertaining to the Spanish-American War. A retired Pentagon security expert told Congress recently that less than one-half of one per cent of the classified material contains information that might justify its being kept secret. He estimated the cost of the classification system at \$50 million a year.

The true price we have paid for secrecy, however, is incalculable. We have turned over our sovereignty to an intellectual elite of cold-blooded Presidential advisers, to arrogant bureaucrats and megalomaniacal politicians whose every move has been guided by their profound conviction that they *know* what is best for us—and for all of the peoples of the world. We must regain control over our own government, and the way to begin is to insist on opening its processes to the light of day. As John Kenneth Galbraith recently observed, "Our safety lies, and lies exclusively, in making public decision subject to the test of public debate. What cannot survive public debate—as the experience of Vietnam shows—we must not do."

In attacking the problem of secrecy, we must reject the suggestions being advanced by some well-intentioned persons, and some not so well-intentioned, that what we need is some sort of commission or committee of "wise men" to screen the Government's secrets and ascertain which of them can safely be divulged to the people. We do not need another elite group making decisions for us; we do not need another filter—even a filter of "wise men"—through which the truth must pass before it reaches us.

Our fourth obligation is to re-establish the role of Congress as a co-equal branch of government. We must do this despite the fact that the principal culprit in the decline of legislative power in the United States has been Congress itself. If our nation is to be a representative democracy in anything but name, the people's representatives must have not only full access to information but power to act on it.



The extent to which that power has eroded is made manifest in the Pentagon Papers. They show how Congress has been manipulated into giving its consent, explicit or implicit, to actions of the Executive Branch it did not know about, or did not understand, or misunderstood because of deliberate deception. There is no reason to assume that such deception has abated. Only a few weeks ago, for example, a dispatch from Vientiane in *The Washington Evening Star* reported on the Nixon Administration's "new gimmick . . . to pay for Thai troops in Laos if the Senate prohibits funds for the Thais. . . . The gimmick is to hide payment to the Thai troops serving in Laos in funds earmarked for Thailand itself." The *Star's* correspondent, Tammy Arbuckle, said his sources "had no doubt this scheme would succeed."

Like slaves who learn to beg for the lash, some members of Congress seem to revel in their own loss of authority. Others chafe under it but make no meaningful attempt to redress. A few seem to have acquired new determination from the Vietnam disclosures to reassert their jurisdiction. It is our responsibility to help ourselves by helping them, and to elect to Congress men and women who will proudly serve our interests instead of abdicating responsibility to the men in the Executive Branch.

We have an obligation to assess responsibility for what was done. This is not, as some former officials and their apologists are suggesting, a matter of finding "scapegoats" for the war, or of "witch-hunting," or of practicing a kind of "McCarthyism of the Left." It is a matter of protecting our future. The Pentagon papers make clear that crimes have been committed in our name—America hanged men in Nuremberg and Tokyo for conspiring to plan and wage aggressive war—but we are not suggesting that anyone be hanged.

We are suggesting that men whose gross defects of both character and judgment now stand exposed before the world should have no further role in determining our destiny. Some of these men are still in office. Some have withdrawn, temporarily, to the academies or the foundations or the corpo-



"What's so  
'top secret,' Dad? I've been telling  
you that for years"

rations, where they await their next turn at the levers of power. We must deprive them of that opportunity.

Our obligation is to be true to our-

selves. We must disabuse ourselves of the myths in which our politics have become encrusted—especially the myth of a noble America doing its best to do good. Our relations to our Government must be governed by skepticism, not confidence. In his first reaction to the Vietnam papers, former Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey said it was "a sad day" because "what's in these documents will do a great deal to damage confidence in government. It only aids and abets the doubts, cynicisms, and suspicions about government." Senator Humphrey was mistaken. The raising of doubts about government is not sad—it is a sign of hope.

The Pentagon Papers have shown us how far America has traveled down the road to Empire, and how many of its "leaders" are ready, willing, and eager to shoulder the burden of imposing their will throughout the world.

Our burden and our obligation must be, first, to make them stop, and, second, through the electoral process, to remove them from their positions of power.

## Honoring the Founding Fathers


In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. The Government's power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people.

Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the Government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.

In my view, far from deserving condemnation for their courageous reporting, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and other newspapers should be commended for serving the purpose that the Founding Fathers saw so clearly. In revealing the workings of government that led to the Vietnam war, the newspapers nobly did precisely that which the Founders hoped and trusted they would do.

*From Justice Hugo L. Black's concurring opinion, in which Justice William O. Douglas joined, in the Supreme Court's decision in the case of the Pentagon Papers.*





## Aid for Another Dictator

There is scarcely a dictator in the world whose hands are too bloody for the U.S. Government to support—all under the pretext of containing Communism. We have backed brutal regimes in Spain, South Vietnam, Greece, and Latin America for years. Now the Nixon Administration has disclosed that it intends to continue military and economic aid to the Pakistan government headed by General Yahya Khan, whose army of West Pakistanis has drenched East Pakistan in blood and caused nearly six million of its people to flee across the border into India.

After the mass killings by Khan's army drew worldwide attention last spring, the Nixon Administration announced it was suspending arms shipments to his government. But as the press and Senators Stuart Symington of Missouri and Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts have revealed, no suspension has taken place. After a recent hearing before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, chairman Kennedy disclosed that "in violation of the understanding conveyed to me and others in Congress, our Government has freely tolerated at least three shipments of military equipment to Pakistan over the past two months." Senator Kennedy revealed that another ship, docking in New York, was to be loaded with military hardware for Pakistan "and four to five more ships are expected to be loaded in the coming weeks." The Senator added: "I've

asked the Administration to stop the policy of shipping arms to Pakistan."

The Administration has other ideas. Its Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Christopher Van Hollen, told the Subcommittee that the United States would continue economic aid to Pakistan so that Washington would have "leverage" in persuading Khan to seek a "political accommodation" in East Pakistan on the basis of autonomy for that region and to create conditions allowing the refugees to return. He said the Government will keep selling "nonlethal" military items to Pakistan so that Khan would not turn to other sources such as Communist China. But he conceded that China has been supplying arms to Pakistan all along. To stop shipments, he said, would "be seen as sanctions and intrusions in [Pakistan's] internal problems."

With such solemn lunacies has the Administration reacted to the fact that military aid sent from this and other countries over the years has helped to keep Pakistan a military autocracy for the past two decades, contributed to its conflict with India over Kashmir in 1965, and finally armed Khan's regime with the weapons to slaughter nearly 200,000 East Pakistanis after the people of the eastern region had won a majority of the seats of Pakistan's national assembly—an assembly that never met.

Meanwhile, most of the eleven nations in the Aid to Pakistan Consortium have decided to withhold economic assistance, which runs to about

\$500 million a year, until there is a political settlement of the crisis which divides West Pakistan from East Pakistan. The World Bank had recommended that consortium members take such action.

Chester Bowles, longtime U.S. ambassador to India, has proposed that the United States lodge a strong protest with the Khan government, and cut off all aid except medical supplies and food—a proposal we heartily endorse.

Khan promises that Pakistan will move toward democracy as rapidly as possible, but meanwhile martial law will remain in effect. We have heard all this before. The Greek junta promised it would restore democracy—someday—and Washington said it would use the "leverage" of military aid to hurry such restoration. There is little evidence that U.S. "leverage" was brought into play in the cause of Greek freedom. We do not expect to see it used constructively on the Pakistan government. Again we are given more of the foreign policy double talk at which our Government has become so adept during its quarter-century prosecution of the Cold War.

## Retreat on Housing

The noose of lily-white suburbs that surrounds and strangles most of the nation's decaying cities will not be loosened in the Nixon Administration. That seems to be the import, as best we can make it out, of the extraordinarily vague and murky 8,000 word statement on Federal housing policy issued by the White House a few weeks ago.

The statement contained a reasonably adequate and accurate commentary on the oppressive burden of housing discrimination. It noted that "no nation is rich enough and strong enough to afford the price which dehumanizing living environments extract in the form of wasted human potential and stunted human lives." It pledged the President to observe

the law which "bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property."

But on the crucial question which has been intensely debated within the Department of Housing and Urban Development for many months, Mr. Nixon came down squarely on the side of inaction. "We will not seek to impose economic integration upon an existing local jurisdiction," he said, thereby effectively ignoring the provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 which directs the Secretary of HUD to "administer the programs and activities relating to housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to further" fair housing.

Stripped of its rhetoric, the statement was merely a reassertion of the policy laid down by the President last December: "I believe that forced integration of the suburbs is not in the national interest."

The President's references to "forced" or "imposed" integration should be recognized as the deck-stacking terms they are. He does not, after all, make speeches or issue policy statements disavowing "forced" taxation or "imposed" enforcement of the criminal statutes. He has never explained why racial and economic justice alone are exempt from Federal enforcement.

Only a few days before the White House released its statement, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights took the Administration to task for the "continuing pattern of racial segregation" fostered by Federal housing programs. The Commission pointed out that HUD, which presently may employ "persuasion" to prevent discrimination, won't even say whether it would support legislation giving it some real clout—the authority to issue cease and desist orders against discriminatory housing practices.

As the Commission Chairman, the Reverend Theodore M. Hesburgh, told HUD Secretary George Romney, "There is no such thing as putting [on] too much pressure for what ought to be."

"I've made speeches like that myself—I'll send copies to you," Romney replied, adding that "no one believes more in the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of God" than he does.

Perhaps Secretary Romney ought to send copies of his speeches to the White House.

## Defectors from the AMA

Although television's Marcus Welby, M.D., may be paying dues to the American Medical Association, more than half of the nation's doctors are not. For the first time in at least fifty years the AMA, according to its own statistics, cannot point to its roll of dues-payers and claim to speak for a majority of U.S. doctors.

"The development," said a *New York Times* report, "threatens to undermine seriously the financial and political power of the nation's strongest health lobby."

As the year opened, 50.3 per cent of the country's 334,028 doctors of medicine were AMA dues-payers, but since then the state medical societies of New York, Nebraska, Montana, Nevada, and Mississippi have dropped the requirement that their members must also be AMA members. As a result, an estimated 9,000 New York doctors and some from the other four states have stopped paying the parent organization, thereby dropping its national membership below the fifty per cent mark.

There may be further membership declines; the California Medical Association is polling its 24,000 members to find out how they feel about dropping the state group's requirement that they must be members of the AMA.

Dr. George Himmler of Manhattan, president of the New York State Medical Society, said of the AMA drop-outs: "I think part of this is protest—let's call it questioning—by the doctors of what the AMA is doing for them for \$110 a year."

Dues were \$70 before this year. The \$40 increase in 1971, plus a slight rise in membership—but not enough to bring fifty per cent of the country's doctors under the AMA tent—will bolster the organization's flagging fi-

nances. To improve its public image the AMA will spend \$1.5 million on an advertising campaign over the next two years, a campaign which some members have criticized as too costly and unnecessary.

The defections from the AMA will not be halted by advertising or other forms of image building. A growing number of doctors, especially the younger ones, have become increasingly resentful of the AMA's lobbying against proposals for an effective program of national health care, its resistance to prepaid group practice, and its ties to the drug monopolies which bilk Americans of enormous sums each year. Many of the people who pay medical bills, as well as many doctors, have soured on the AMA over the years and we doubt that \$1.5 million, or even \$15 million, worth of advertising antiacid will cure that bilious condition.

## Money and Politics

Politics is a growth industry. Total expenditures for political campaigning increased by fifty per cent between 1964 and 1968, reaching an all-time high of at least \$300 million in the latter year. The Presidential campaign cost nineteen cents per vote in 1952 and sixty cents per vote in 1968. It is likely that \$400 million or more will be spent on next year's political exertions.

A political system which requires such astronomical expenditures inevitably depends on contributors capable of making astronomical donations. In 1968, 424 individuals gave at least \$10,000 each, for a total of more than \$12 million—\$7.7 million to the Republicans and \$4.3 million to the Democrats. Forty-three persons made "loans" amounting to more than \$3.1 million to the Democratic Party.

These figures come from an exhaustive study, *Financing the 1968 Election*, conducted by the Citizens Research Foundation of Princeton, New Jersey, and its director, Herbert E. Alexander. The report, published



last month by D. C. Heath and Company, is the most detailed ever compiled on the role of money in American politics. Still, it is inadequate and incomplete, for reporting requirements at the Federal level and in most of the states are so vague, lax, and riddled with loopholes as to leave huge and significant donations unrecorded.

The study reveals, nonetheless, such intriguing facts as these: that ten wealthy backers of the Nixon campaign, who contributed a recorded total of \$300,000, have been rewarded with ambassadorships; that fifty-nine officers and board members of the American Petroleum Institute contributed at least \$429,366 to Republicans and \$30,606 to Democrats in 1968; that eleven prominent families, with a total of 122 contributing members, gave more than \$2.5 million to the Republican Party.

The pernicious implications in these figures are self-evident. They have been well summed up by the National Committee for an Effective Congress, which has waged a long but, to this point, unsuccessful campaign for reform of political spending practices: "As soaring costs force candidates to depend on big money givers, many qualified people who lack rich backers or who refuse to make concessions to obtain such support are effectively frozen out of the political process. The danger is a system closed and un-

responsive to all but a few, and it grows with each election."

Congress has been irresponsibly dilatory in addressing itself to the problem of political spending, and the deadline for 1972 is rapidly approaching. In recent testimony before the Elections Subcommittee of the Committee on House Administration, NCEC Director Russell Hemenway spelled out a practical program of reform:

- Full and timely reporting of all campaign funds, to be widely publicized throughout the campaign, both before and after the election, and to encompass primaries, party caucuses and conventions, intra-state committees, and other activities not covered by current law.

- Reasonable limits on spending for such "highly visible items" as radio and television advertising, newspapers and magazines, and billboards.

- Tough penalties for violations, including the barring from office of candidates who break the law.

- Reductions in basic campaign costs, such as advertising and postage rates, "to assure candidates of moderate means the opportunity to reach the voters at a reasonable cost."

This is, as Hemenway acknowledged, a "minimum" program. But unless it, or something very much like it, is enacted this year, the next cam-

paign is likely to be even more remote from the people, and even less responsive to their wishes and needs, than the last one.

## Dr. Stanton's 'Crime'

The Administration's efforts to keep the press from publishing the Pentagon's Vietnam papers have inevitably overshadowed an equally pernicious assault on the First Amendment mounted by the House Commerce Committee under the chairmanship of Representative Harley O. Staggers, West Virginia Democrat. After weeks of harassing the Columbia Broadcasting System for its outstanding documentary, "The Selling of the Pentagon," the Committee voted last month to cite CBS President Frank Stanton for contempt of Congress.

Dr. Stanton's "crime" was his refusal to provide the Committee with "out-takes"—segments of film and tape deleted in preparing the documentary for broadcast. These would show, the Committee insists, that CBS "deceived" the public in its presentation. Stanton maintains that "out-takes," like reporters' notes, need not be submitted for official scrutiny.

The crucial question, it seems to us, is whether any governmental body can hold a news agency accountable for its presentation. We do not know whether CBS's editing procedures would meet our own standards of fairness and accuracy. We do know that no one has designated the House Commerce Committee to serve as censors or judges of the press.

"I sincerely hope," Dr. Stanton said after the Committee cited him for contempt, "that the House of Representatives will not confirm a citation of contempt which, though directed at CBS, is in effect taking dead aim at the First Amendment."

The House has not yet acted, at this writing, on the Committee's citation. To dispose of it properly, it need only refer to the language of the First Amendment, which says, "Congress shall make *no law*" inhibiting the freedom of the press.

## Now You Know

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: "We have often read in the papers that American soldiers, including marines, refer to the Vietnamese as dinks, gooks, or slants. Is the terminology generally used?"

SGT. RICHARD D. WALLACE (U.S. Armed Forces): (Deleted).

MR. FULBRIGHT: "Which is the more fashionable?"

SGT. WALLACE: (Deleted).

MR. FULBRIGHT: "Is that a word of affection?"

SGT. WALLACE: (Deleted).

MR. FULBRIGHT: "Is it respect? What it is?"

SGT. WALLACE: (Deleted).

—From the transcript of a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing



## The Word from Washington

As if Attorney General John N. Mitchell didn't have enough to do, what with trying to repeal the First Amendment and all, he is also roaming the countryside explaining why he ought to be allowed to repeal the Fourth. Not long ago he was in Roanoke, Virginia, telling the Virginia State Bar Association all about the "firm legal basis" which, in his view, supports the doctrine that the Government may tap the telephone conversations of anyone it deems to be a threat to the national security.


Mitchell's speech to the Virginia lawyers was a peculiar exercise in several respects, the first of which was that he delivered it at all. The issue is to come before the Supreme Court next fall, on appeal from the Sixth Circuit which found the Government's contention to be "breathtaking" but constitutionally unsound. In the past, as *The New York Times* pointed out, "when matters have been pending before the Supreme Court, Justice Department officials have avoided making statements that might be regarded as exerting pressure upon the justices." The Attorney General doesn't pay much mind to such niceties.

Nor does he pay much mind to the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure. It is his contention that the Government ought to be free to eavesdrop on "dangerous" radicals, without even the formality of a prior court order, because "the threat to our society from so-called 'domestic' subversion is as serious as any threat from abroad." The Attorney General has apparently ascertained that the radical priests Daniel and Philip Berrigan, like the Soviets, are armed with nuclear missiles.

Mitchell maintains that the President, "by virtue of his office and sources of information, is in a far better position" than the courts to determine whether wiretaps ought to be

imposed in domestic political cases. He asked the Virginia lawyers, "Are we, then, to trust the courts to fulfill their oath of office without abusing it but not trust the President in fulfilling his oath?"

That's right.



From time to time back in 1966, 1967, and 1968 we would slip down to the White House basement to receive our latest consignment of secret Vietnam papers. Invariably they were "progress reports" proving conclusively that U.S. victory was just around the corner. Often they were buttressed by extracts from "captured enemy documents" demonstrating that the other side was on the brink of collapse. Usually there were charts and graphs, too—handsome full-color productions showing steady and impressive increases in enemy casualties, Vietcong surrenders, villages pacified.

The man who dispensed all these goodies was Walt Whitman Rostow, President Johnson's special adviser on national security affairs, and he handed them out with genial magnanimity to any member of the press corps who took the trouble to ask. Some who forgot to ask were reminded: "President Johnson wants you to see these," Rostow would say, pushing a pile of classified documents across his desk.

The assumption was that the good news would promptly find its way into print, and usually it did. There were, needless to say, no warnings against breaching "national security," no midnight huddles at the Department of Justice, no frantic calls pleading with publishers to stop the presses, no appeals to the courts to impose censorship.

And so when all those things started happening with publication of the Pentagon's Vietnam papers in June, we wondered what it was that sudden-

ly made all the difference. Well, we think we have it all figured out, and we offer some guidance, free of charge, to our colleagues in the press: The "national security" is not jeopardized by printing lies. You can only get into trouble for telling the truth.



The greatest hazard one was likely to encounter on those periodic trips to W. W. Rostow's bargain basement was to bump into Joseph Alsop on the stairs. He was by far the steadiest and most faithful customer for secret papers, needing frequent reassurance that the Government was doing all it could to win *his* war. The North Vietnamese, we suspect, sometimes read about "captured documents" in Alsop's column before Hanoi even knew they had gone astray.

It has been diverting, therefore, to read Brother Alsop's recent fulminations against what he calls *The New York Times'* "collection of stolen Pentagon documents," and his denunciations of attempts to understand the roots of American involvement in Vietnam as "an orgy of public hypocrisy" and "a revival of McCarthyism."

We would think, to the contrary, that Alsop would welcome the Vietnam disclosures. They show, after all, that America's foremost policy planners were every bit as misguided and irresponsible in private as Alsop was in public through all those long years.



Some of the reactions to publication of the Pentagon's Vietnam archives have been almost as illuminating as the documents themselves. Like the Bourbons of France, America's decision-makers seem blessed with the gift of remembering everything while learning nothing.

Predictably, the first word from the brooding exile at the LBJ Ranch was that it was all a Kennedy plot. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey also ran true to form, making it known at once that he had not the foggiest notion of



what was going on while he served as Vice President.

Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk acknowledged that he had "underestimated the persistence and the tenacity of the North Vietnamese," but added in the next breath that he was sure "they're continuing to come" only because of "the divisions here at home."

Walt Rostow indignantly rejected the suggestion (advanced by James Reston in *The New York Times*) that he and his colleagues in the national security establishment had failed to examine the morality of the war. "For a great nation to make the commitments we have to Southeast Asia involves a moral commitment to stay with them," he wrote in rebuttal, pretending that the fraudulence of those commitments had not been exposed. "I believe it immoral to walk away from our treaty commitments, which other nations and human beings have taken as the foundations for their lives in the most literal sense."

Another alumnus of the Johnson Administration, John P. Roche, insisted that Vietnam was destroyed in the interests of preserving peace. "Bombing of North Vietnam was seen as a way of avoiding war," he explained, displaying the marvelous logic that still seems to inhabit the White House.

Perhaps the most revealing comments of all came from General Maxwell Taylor, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former ambassador to Saigon, and perennial adviser to Presidents, who was distressed by what he called the "deliberate betrayal of Government secrets." What of "the principle of the people's right to know?" a television interviewer asked, and Taylor replied:

"I don't believe in that as a general principle. You have to talk about cases. What is a citizen to do after reading these documents that he wouldn't have done otherwise? A citizen should know the things he needs to know to be a good citizen and discharge his function."

General Taylor said he "wouldn't know" about the morality of the war, but he did know that America had paid "a very heavy price." Maybe it was worth it, though, "to discover our

weaknesses in time to correct them before we're faced with a major crisis."

And what are those weaknesses? Well, Taylor's list might not be yours or ours, but here, for what it's worth, it is: "Division in the minorities, loss of patriotism, degradation and defamation of all virtues which made us a great country in the past, the use of our own media to destroy us internally. . . ."



It was good to see newspapermen scurrying after scoops again. Not the least of the beneficial results of the Vietnam disclosures was the reminder they provided to reporters that they need not spend all their days rewriting official handouts. As they hurried off to mysterious rendezvous to pick up their parcels of documents from equally mysterious intermediaries, the reporters displayed a kind of enthusiasm we have not observed for a long time.

"For the first time in twenty years," one correspondent told us, "I'm proud to be a journalist."



Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin, ever vigilant against waste of the taxpayers' money, has exposed the fact that the Department of Transportation spent \$12,800 to print 50,000 copies of a children's booklet featuring such characters as "The Supersonic Pussycat" and "Shaky the Helicopter."

He calls it "little more than an attempt to propagandize our children as to the virtues of the SST," and notes that the booklet "minimizes—indeed, almost dismisses—the problem of the sonic boom. It makes no reference whatsoever to other environmental problems, such as excessive sideline noise or upper atmospheric pollution. It praises the virtue of speed to the hilt, but without mentioning that fewer than three per cent of us might ever be able to take advantage of it."

Senator Proxmire says he sees "absolutely no justification for this type of

expenditure, however small it may be." Well, we're not so sure. Perhaps the Department of Transportation was merely trying to prepare the kiddies, gently, for the horrors with which they'll have to try to cope when they grow up. Perhaps other Government agencies ought to devise their own lovable little animals to help pave the way for their own monstrosities.

We'd like to read aloud to our own children the adventures of "The Antiballistic Anteater," "The Multiple Independently Targetable Muskrat," and "The Recession Raccoon." And how about "The Indochina Iguana"? We'll bet that would be a cute one.



Big Brother Department (Let-Me-See-Your-Papers Division): According to an announcement in the good, gray pages of the *Federal Register*, the Justice Department's Immigration and Naturalization Service is promulgating rules for the issuance of "U.S. Citizen Identification Cards," which will be used "to facilitate identification in the United States by immigration officers and entry over land borders from foreign contiguous territory."

The rules stipulate that a citizen who wants to be properly identifiable may obtain a card by submitting an application, proof of citizenship, a photograph, and a modest fee. On request, he "shall appear in person before an immigration officer in the United States for examination under oath or affirmation upon the application."

The card, says the *Federal Register*, "may be declared void, without notice, by an immigration officer for proper cause. Possession of the card by other than the rightful holder, loss of citizenship by the person to whom the card was issued, or a determination that the card was obtained by fraud shall be grounds, though not exclusive, for voidance. . . . No appeal shall lie from a decision voiding an identification card."

The year is 1984 minus thirteen, and counting.

—POTOMACUS



# WHAT WE KNOW NOW

by ERWIN KNOLL

THE Reverend Will Campbell of Nashville, Tennessee, and points South, who carries his Christian ministry with equal and unalloyed love to black revolutionaries and white Klansmen, knows how to preach a fearsome fire-and-brimstone sermon. I heard him once, many years ago, describe to members of a rural flock the damnation that awaited them on Judgment Day unless they mended their racist ways. "You'll look up from the Bottomless Pit," he thundered, "and you'll cry, 'Lord, Lord, we didn't know. We didn't know!' And the Lord will look down over the edge of Glory and he'll say, 'Waaal, you know now!' and he'll slam down the lid."

Waaal, we know now. We know, thanks to the 7,700 pages of history and documentation compiled in the Pentagon, thanks to the newspapers that seized the opportunity to make the record public, how we were enticed, frightened, cajoled, deceived, seduced into waging aggressive and brutal war in Indochina. We don't know all of it yet, and perhaps we never will, but we know enough. In a way we are lucky, for we have come to know before the final judgment day. And though our lords did their best to try to slam down the lid, their efforts were repulsed by the U.S. Supreme Court.

We know now that it was no "mistake," no "accident," no "quagmire" into which America was inadvertently drawn, one reluctant footstep at a time. We know that over more than two decades, through five Administrations, we have been embarked on an in-

exorable pursuit of Empire, conceived, planned, and executed in our name by a small band of willful men whose disdain for mankind is matched only by their contempt for their fellow Americans.

We know that even those of us who opposed the adventure from the beginning—as *The Progressive* did—were unable to explore the depths of official duplicity. When we accused our Government of being secretive, we hardly imagined the enormity of the secrets it held. When we charged that our Government was lying, we did not fathom the dimension of the lies. When we declared that our reputation, our ideals, our wealth, our young men's limbs and lives were being squandered in a criminal enterprise, we thought that the men who made decisions in our behalf did not understand the nature of the crime. We were wrong; they understood.

We know now that we have been fed a steady diet of deception. More than twenty years ago, when the Truman Administration discovered and proclaimed America's new role as "leader of the Free World," it simultaneously began overt and surreptitious financial and military aid to the doddering French colonial empire to help it hold the peoples of Indochina in subjugation. In the Eisenhower Administration, when the attempt had collapsed, America entered into a "commitment" to the government it had hand-picked for South Vietnam and connived with it to cancel the Vietnamese unification elections that had been called for by the 1954 Geneva Accords. While U.S. propagandists told the world—and their own people—that the Communist North would not permit free elections, the Central Intelligence Agency told President Eisenhower

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that any election would be an overwhelming popular triumph for Ho Chi Minh, in the South as well as in the North.

American involvement intensified during the Kennedy years, and so did the resort to secrecy and deceit. At a press conference on February 14, 1962, President Kennedy announced that at the request of the South Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem, "we have increased our assistance there. And we are supplying logistical assistance, transportation assistance, training, and we have a number of Americans who are taking part in that effort." He did not mention that almost a year previously he had ordered a program of covert hostilities against North Vietnam, including infiltration of agents and their aerial resupply, overflights for the purpose of dropping leaflets, and the formation of "networks of resistance, covert bases, and teams for sabotage and light harassment" inside North Vietnam.

Nor did President Kennedy mention that he had under consideration even then a proposal from General Maxwell Taylor, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the first substantial contingent of American ground forces—8,000 men—be dispatched to South Vietnam. Taylor was careful, as the national security bureaucrats were always careful, to submit a "cover story" with his proposal. "My view," he told Mr. Kennedy, "is that we should put in a task force consisting largely of logistical troops for the purpose of participating in flood relief and at the same time providing a U.S. military presence in Vietnam capable of assuring Diem of our readiness to join him in a military showdown with the Vietcong or Vietminh. . . ."

Throughout 1963, as resistance to the corrupt and despotic Diem regime carried America's client government in Saigon to the brink of collapse, the Kennedy Administration issued a steady stream of encouraging progress reports to the American people. While embassy cables from Saigon predicted imminent disaster, Secretary of State Dean Rusk proclaimed on February 1 that "there are some definitely encouraging elements;" on February 13 that "the momentum of the Communist drive has been stopped;" on April 18 that "the South Vietnamese themselves are fighting their own battle, fighting well;" on April 22 that "there is good basis for encouragement. The Vietnamese are on their way to success and need our help; not just our material help—they need that—but our sympathetic understanding and comradeship."

By the late summer, when it was plain that Diem

could no longer be counted on as America's viceroy in Vietnam, the United States began conspiring with the South Vietnamese military for his overthrow. Again, the emphasis was on secrecy and deceit. On October 2, Washington advised our embassy in Saigon: ". . . President today approved recommendations that no initiative should now be taken to give any active, overt encouragement to a coup. There should, however, be urgent covert effort with closest security under broad guidance of ambassador to identify and build contacts with alternative leadership as and when it appears. Essential that this effort be totally secure and fully deniable and separated entirely from normal political analysis and reporting and other activities of the country team." On October 30, McGeorge Bundy, the President's special assistant for national security, cabled Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge: "Once a coup under responsible leadership has begun, and within these restrictions, it is in the interest of the U.S. Government that it should succeed." The coup was consummated on November 1.

The great leap forward into the credibility chasm occurred in the Johnson years, as America plunged deeper and deeper into a war it was determined to conceal. On March 17, 1964, National Security Action Memorandum Number 288 declared that it was U.S. policy "to prepare immediately to be in a position on seventy-two hours' notice to initiate the 'Retaliatory Actions' against North Vietnam, and to be in a position on thirty days' notice to initiate the program of 'Graduated Overt Military Pressure' against North Vietnam." Ten weeks later, when the President was asked at a news conference about charges (by Melvin R. Laird, then a Republican Representative from Wisconsin) that the Administration was "preparing to move the Vietnam war into the North," Mr. Johnson replied: "I know of no plans that have been made to that effect."

Through the summer and fall of 1964, as President Johnson ran for election as a moderate, a man of peace, against the reckless saber-rattling of Republican Senator Barry M. Goldwater of Arizona, the crisis managers in the Pentagon, the State Department, the CIA, and the National Security Council were making detailed preparations for a wider war—one which they understood would have to be deferred until after Election Day. Months before the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the document that would become the Tonkin Resolution was drafted to confer on the President virtually unchecked power to wage hostilities; it needed only an opportune pretext for presentation to the Congress. Meanwhile, covert "34A Operations" against North Vietnam were intensified, and U.S. destroyers were dispatched on "DeSoto Patrols" to gather intelligence and intimidate Hanoi. When one such patrol produced the Tonkin incident early in August, Defense

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**"We don't know all of it yet, and perhaps we never will, but we know enough."**

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Secretary Robert S. McNamara was asked why U.S. destroyers were in the Gulf. "It is a routine patrol," he replied, "of the type we carry out in international waters all over the world."

On September 3, Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton drew up a memorandum headed **PLAN OF ACTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM**, which included this list of "special considerations during next two months": "The relevant 'audiences' of U.S. action are the Communists (who must feel strong pressures), the South Vietnamese (whose morale must be buoyed), our allies (who must trust us as 'underwriters'), and the U.S. public (which must support our risk-taking with U.S. lives and prestige). During the next two months, because of the lack of 'rebuttal time' before elections to justify particular actions which may be distorted to the U.S. public, we must act with special care—signaling to the DRV [North Vietnam] that initiatives are being taken, to the GVN [South Vietnam] that we are behaving energetically despite the restraints of our political season, and to the U.S. public that we are behaving with good purpose and restraint."

By September 7, according to the Pentagon's historians, the planners had reached a "general consensus" in favor of a systematic U.S. bombing campaign directed at the North. But two weeks later, President Johnson told the American people: "There are those who say, you ought to go North and drop bombs, to try to wipe out the supply lines, and they think that would escalate the war. We don't want our American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys. We don't want to get involved in a nation with 700 million people and get tied down in a land war in Asia."

On February 7, 1965, as Lyndon Johnson settled in for a full term, McGeorge Bundy wrote in a memorandum to him: "We believe that the best available way of increasing our chance of success in Vietnam is the development and execution of a policy of *sustained reprisal* against North Vietnam. . . . We may wish at the outset to relate our reprisals to those acts of relative high visibility such as the Pleiku incident. Later we might retaliate against the assassination of a province chief . . . we might retaliate against a grenade thrown into a crowded cafe in Saigon. . . . Once a program of reprisals is clearly under way, it should not be necessary to connect each specific act against North Vietnam to a particular outrage in the South. . . ."

On the same day the White House issued a statement about the enemy's "deliberate surprise attacks" on two U.S. barracks areas near Pleiku, South Vietnam: ". . . These attacks were made possible by the continuing infiltration of personnel from North Vietnam. . . . As in the case of the North Vietnamese attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin last August, the response [bombing of the North] is appropriate and fitting. . . . We seek no wider war."

On April 1, Mr. Johnson chided reporters for being "too dramatic about our prophecies and predictions



Herblock in The Washington Post

"You're our permanent panelist"

and I might say too irresponsible sometimes." There was, he assured them, "no far-reaching strategy that is being suggested or promulgated" for escalating the war. On the same day, according to National Security Action Memorandum Number 328, the President "approved the urgent exploration of twelve suggestions for covert and other actions" submitted by the CIA, approved the addition of 18,000 to 20,000 men to the U.S. "military support" forces in Vietnam (which already numbered 27,000), and approved a change of mission—from defense to offense—for the Marine battalions stationed in Vietnam. The change "had momentous implications," the Pentagon historians noted, but the President "was greatly concerned that the step be given as little prominence as possible."

The decision in mid-July to commit 200,000 U.S. troops to combat "was perceived as a threshold—entrance into an Asian land war," the Pentagon study pointed out. "The conflict was seen to be long, with further U.S. deployments to follow." But President Johnson told the press and the people at his next news conference, "It does not imply any change in policy whatever. It does not imply any change of objective."

We know now that there has never been any change of policy, any change of objective. We know that from the beginning of American intervention, U.S. policy has clung tenaciously to the goal of establishing a "free



world bastion"—that is, an outpost of Empire—in Indochina. We know that the presence of a Communist regime in Indochina has been viewed as a threat to the "national security" of the world's foremost power—a threat so formidable that all means short of total annihilation could be invoked in the attempt to extirpate it. And we know that the men who held these views and acted in accord with them fiercely resisted any suggestion that they might have been mistaken. Most of the time, however, they simply ignored that possibility.

The basic considerations that govern American policy toward Southeast Asia were articulated by the National Security Council as early as January, 1954, in a statement approved by President Eisenhower. Its fundamental premise was that "Communist domination, by whatever means, of all Southeast Asia would seriously endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the longer term, United States security interests. The statement emphasized that "in the conflict in Indochina, the Communist and non-Communist worlds clearly confront one another in the field of battle." The loss of that struggle, it warned, "would have the most serious repercussions on the U.S. and free world interests," might lead to Communist takeover of all of Southeast Asia, Indonesia, and India, and "endanger the stability and security of Europe."

This was the domino doctrine in its most primitive form, but American policy makers found it powerfully persuasive. On its strength, the National Security Council went on to contemplate the possibility that the United States might "become involved in an all-out

war with Communist China, and possibly with the USSR and the rest of the Soviet bloc, and should therefore proceed to take large-scale mobilization measures."

In National Security Council Paper Number 5809, dated April 2, 1958, President Eisenhower directed the Government to "work toward the weakening of the Communists of North and South Vietnam in order to bring about the eventual peaceful reunification of a free and independent Vietnam under anti-Communist leadership."

From time to time, questions about the inherent logic of U.S. policy were raised even within the national security establishment. Invariably, such challenges were brushed aside. In June, 1964, President Johnson asked the CIA whether "the rest of Southeast Asia necessarily [would] fall if Laos and South Vietnam came under North Vietnamese control." The agency replied:

"With the possible exception of Cambodia, it is likely that no nation in the area would quickly succumb to Communism as a result of the fall of Laos and South Vietnam. Furthermore, a continuation of the spread of Communism in the area would not be inexorable, and any spread which did occur would take time—time in which the total situation might change in any number of ways unfavorable to the Communist cause."

That CIA analysis—a categorical rejection of the domino doctrine—was part of the agency's pessimistic assessment of the results likely to be attained by the bombing program that was about to win the Administration's approval. The CIA assessment was ignored. Five years later it was repeated, almost verbatim, for the benefit of the Nixon Administration, and again it was ignored. If President Nixon had pulled U.S. troops out of Vietnam at the beginning of his Administration and opened the way for Communist rule in Saigon, the CIA found, "We would lose Laos immediately. Sihanouk would preserve Cambodia by a straddling effort. All of Southeast Asia would remain just as it is at least for another generation." That vision of the future, we know now, did not suffice for a President determined to keep America from becoming "a pitiful, helpless giant."

The CIA memoranda, it should be understood, were rare examples of fundamental dissent in what was normally a monolithic planning process pursued by men who quarreled over tactics, usually agreed on strategy, and rarely indulged in introspection over basic goals. "There appears to have been, in fact, remarkably little latitude for reopening the basic question about U.S. involvement in the Vietnam struggle," the Pentagon's historians pointed out. Such major decisions as the landing of U.S. Marines at Danang in March, 1965—a "pivotal" move that set the stage for a U.S. land war in Asia—were made "without much fanfare—and without much planning."

Daniel Ellsberg, the former Vietnam planner whose

## If Only They Knew . . .

I am sure that the great American people, if only they knew the true facts and the background to the developments in South Vietnam, will agree with me that further bloodshed is unnecessary. And also that the political and diplomatic method of discussions and negotiations alone can create conditions which will enable the United States to withdraw gracefully from that part of the world. As you know, in times of war and hostilities the first casualty is truth.

—U THANT, Secretary General of the United Nations, at a news conference on February 25, 1965, after a fruitless five-month effort to persuade the United States to enter negotiations with North Vietnam




act of conscience has made it possible for us to know what we now know, recalls no instance when considerations of morality entered into the planning process. Ellsberg's former chief in Vietnam, Major General Edward G. Lansdale, the original "Quiet American" who headed the pacification program, confirms the recollection. "We really didn't get into that type of discussion," Lansdale told *The New York Times*. "There was too much to do every day with immediate problems."

We know now that it was absurd to suggest, as each of our recent Presidents has suggested, that if-we-only-knew-what-they-knew we would cheerfully endorse their policies. We know now how little they really knew, and how often what they thought they knew bore no relation to reality. We know that on the few occasions when those who did know tried to break through with the facts, their efforts were frustrated and even punished.

When the National Security Council met on August 26, 1963, Paul H. Kattenburg, a career Foreign Service Officer with ten years of direct experience with Vietnam, tried to tell President Kennedy's advisers that they were embarked on a disastrous course. "At this juncture," Kattenburg told Vice President Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, and the others there assembled, "it would be better for us to make the decision to get out honorably." Support for the Saigon regime was dwindling rapidly, he maintained, and America was wasting its prestige and staining its honor in a losing cause. Rusk dismissed his analysis as "speculative." Johnson and McNamara agreed with Rusk, and Kattenburg was on his way out of responsibility for Vietnam planning. His duties in the past eight years have included a stint as second in command of the American mission in Georgetown, Guyana. He will retire this month as an instructor at the Foreign Service Institute in Arlington, Virginia.

Under Secretary of State George W. Ball was luckier. A persistent advocate of "compromise solutions" in Vietnam, he was installed in the Johnson Administration as the "devil's advocate" in residence—a sort of latter-day court jester whose dissents were tolerated and even encouraged to demonstrate the Administration's willingness to hear—and ignore—all points of view. Ball enjoyed a monopoly in that role. When McNamara, deeply disillusioned with the failure of the war he had programmed with the latest scientific management techniques, began in 1966 and 1967 to disavow the views he had formerly espoused, there was no choice for him but to depart. In 1964, the Pentagon's "Sigma" war games had indicated that a bombing campaign directed at North Vietnam would not bring the enemy to its knees. The results of "Sigma" were dismissed. In 1967, McNamara concluded that the "Sigma" forecast had been correct. He was dismissed.

Walt W. Rostow, who succeeded McGeorge Bundy as Johnson's principal adviser on national security



**Topless Secret**

affairs, was not dismissed. For years he maintained that "calculated doses" of American airpower directed at North Vietnam would bring a halt to the insurrection in the South. For all we know, he still maintains, down in Austin, Texas, that it will.

We know now that the enemy knew all about what we were not permitted to know. We know that the elaborate secrecy precautions, the carefully contrived subterfuges, were intended not to deceive "the other side" but us. When President Johnson decided to widen the war in April, 1965, all members of the National Security Council received written instructions to this effect:

"The President desires that . . . premature publicity be avoided by all possible precautions. The actions themselves should be taken as rapidly as practicable, but in ways that should minimize any appearance of sudden changes in policy, and official statements on these troop movements will be made only with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State. The President's desire is that these movements and changes should be understood as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy."

Was this designed to throw the enemy off guard? The enemy knew all about it. It knew when it began encountering American troops in combat. It knew when its bases and plants and homes and pagodas were being bombed. It knew when its territory was invaded



by infiltration teams and when its coast was harassed by South Vietnamese torpedo boats under American direction. It knew, but the American people didn't.

On July 10, 1965, the North Vietnamese Foreign Office produced—and Radio Hanoi broadcast to the world—a White Book on the Vietnam war. It was, as it turns out, a remarkably accurate document. It charged that American policy planners had decided at Honolulu in June, 1964, “to extend the war to North Vietnam in the form of destruction by air and naval forces.” According to the Pentagon archives, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge had proposed at Honolulu a “selective bombing campaign against military targets in the North,” and had won the backing of McNamara and Rusk.

“Since the beginning of 1964,” Hanoi’s White Book declared, “the U.S. ruling circles have many times discussed the policy of extending the war to North Vietnam. The strategists of the U.S. White House and Pentagon have worked out many plans on this question, of which Plan Number 6 of Walt W. Rostow, the chairman of the policy planning staff of the U.S. State Department, is the most noteworthy.” The Pentagon papers show such planning was constant and intense, and that Rostow submitted memoranda to McNamara and Rusk calling for increasing commitments of airpower and ground forces.

Rostow’s proposals, according to the White Book, were “replenished and amended by John McNaughton, U.S. Assistant Defense Secretary, and now bear the name of the McNaughton Plan, calling for bombing and strafing raids on North Vietnam by the U.S. Air Force.” The Pentagon archive includes McNaughton’s draft of a “proposed course of action” on March 24, 1965, calling for increased air assaults on the North as well as an expanded role for U.S. “combat support” personnel.

A statement issued in December, 1965, by Nguyen Huu Tho, the chairman of the National Liberation Front, asserted that the United States had been operating under a “McNamara Plan” which was “aimed at pacifying the South within the two years of 1964 and 1965.” This evolved, Tho added, into “a defensive strategic plan but also representing a new and greater effort by the U.S. imperialists to improve the critical situation of the puppet government and forces and to concentrate their forces on pacifying the main areas under the Front’s control.” Three years later, when General William C. Westmoreland relinquished

his Vietnam command, he recalled that the strategy for 1964-1965 had been first to halt a “losing trend” and pacify populated areas. In 1965, Westmoreland said, “the U.S. mission’s efforts to support pacification . . . continued to be hampered by political instability.”

Such statements by North Vietnam or the Vietcong received scant attention in the American media. They were merely “Communist propaganda,” and our Government, which knew better, hardly bothered to issue rebuttals.

We know now that America spurned every opportunity to recognize the struggle in South Vietnam for what it was—a civil war waged by insurgents who were determined, first of all, to attain national sovereignty and independence. As a fledgling empire experimenting with the techniques of international manipulation and intrigue, we could not conceive our enemies were not equally subject to manipulation. It was—it had to be—obvious that the insurgents in black pajamas were no more than tools of Hanoi, of Peking, of Moscow.

The CIA had reported, back in the Eisenhower Administration, that the American-backed Diem regime “almost certainly would not be able to defeat the Communists in countrywide elections.” Yet the United States assumed—and continues to assume—that the insurrection had no popular base in the South and could not survive if Hanoi were forced, in Dean Rusk’s memorable phrase, “to stop doing what she is doing.”

In 1961, when the Kennedy Administration initiated covert hostilities against the North, a State Department White Paper cited “ominous” evidence of increasing infiltration of fighting men and supplies into the South, though it acknowledged that many of these were Southerners who had gone North after Diem had canceled the 1956 elections provided for by the Geneva Accords. In 1962, however, a close Kennedy adviser, Michael Forestal, reported that “the vast bulk of both recruits and supplies come from inside South Vietnam itself.” In 1963, William Jorden, the Vietnam expert who had written the 1961 White Paper, was dispatched on a three-month fact-finding trip to prove the thesis of major aggression directed by North Vietnam against the South. He returned with the news that “we are unable to document and develop any hard evidence of infiltration.”

Jorden’s report caused consternation in the Special Group Counter-Insurgency, which President Kennedy had established under the direction of his brother, Robert, and General Maxwell Taylor. Charles Maechling Jr., staff manager of the Special Group, recalled the April 5, 1963, meeting last year in an article for the *Foreign Service Journal*. “To the utter astonishment of those who heard [Jorden’s] briefing, and Attorney General Kennedy’s cross-examination of him, this supposedly honest observer found nothing to

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**“We know now that we have been  
fed a steady diet of deception.”**

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indicate that the insurgency was anything but home-grown," Maechling wrote. "Until 1964 all the military advisers back from Vietnam made the same report: There was plenty of instigation from the North—but hardly 'massive aggression.'"

The Pentagon itself concluded that "the vast majority of Vietcong troops are of local origin," and found "little evidence of major supplies from outside sources. . . . Most arms being captured or stolen from GVN [South Vietnamese] forces or from the French during the Indochina war."

On August 18, 1964, a cable from the U.S. mission in Saigon (which called for "a posture of maximum readiness for a deliberate escalation of pressure against North Vietnam") still referred to the basic problem in the South as "the VC insurgency." Three months later, however, a DRAFT POSITION PAPER ON SOUTH-EAST ASIA circulated by Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy set out his plan to "publicize the evidence of increased infiltration" from North Vietnam along with explanations of "the differences between the present estimates and those given in the past."

The same draft paper proposed a system of "graduated military pressures against North Vietnam" and declared that the United States "would be alert to any sign of yielding by Hanoi, and would be prepared to explore negotiated solutions that attain U.S. objectives in an acceptable manner. The United States would seek to control any negotiations and would oppose any independent South Vietnamese efforts to negotiate."

We know now that peace has never been on the American agenda. Hanoi knew it as long ago as 1965. Its White Book that year declared that while "the U.S. President was prattling about his hoax of unconditional discussions, the U.S. imperialists took new and very cynical and dangerous steps in their policy of war adventure." North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong said in September, 1965: "President Johnson talks about peace in an attempt to cover up his war schemes. The more he talks about peace, the more he steps up the war."

But President Johnson's was not the first Administration to fear that peace might break out in Vietnam. In the Kennedy Administration, in a memorandum to Rusk on August 30, 1963, Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman urged U.S. help and encouragement to those plotting a coup against Ngo Dinh Diem on grounds that Diem might move toward "neutralization negotiations" with the Communists.

In March, 1964, President Johnson wasted no words in disposing of the idea of peace negotiations looking toward a neutralized Vietnam—an idea that had been advanced by French President Charles de Gaulle and the Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, among others. "It ought to be possible to explain in Saigon," Mr. Johnson cabled Ambassador Lodge, "that

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**"We know now that there has never been any change of policy, any change of objective."**

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your mission is precisely for the purpose of knocking down the idea of neutralization wherever it rears its ugly head and on this point I think that nothing is more important than to stop neutralist talk wherever we can by whatever means we can."

"We must continue to oppose any Vietnam conference," William Bundy wrote in a memorandum on August 11, 1964, and America did. When Washington set out its terms for negotiations, the Pentagon historians observed, the conditions were "tantamount to unconditional surrender" for the other side. In 1965, McNamara proposed diplomatic overtures "laying the groundwork for a settlement when the time is ripe," but the Pentagon historians note that this "amounted to little more than saying that the United States should provide channels for the enemy's discreet and relatively face-saving surrender when he decided that the game had grown too costly."

While President Johnson was proclaiming periodic bombing pauses and avowing his eagerness to "go anywhere, any time" for peace, the State Department prudently cautioned embassies abroad: "Insofar as our announcement [of a bombing pause] foreshadows any possibility of a complete bombing stoppage, in the event Hanoi really exercises reciprocal restraints, we regard this as unlikely. . . ."

We know now that the pious affirmations of America's commitment to "the Vietnamese people and their right to self-determination" were hypocritical cant. We thought at the time that Washington had no business telling the Vietnamese what was good for them; we know now that Washington wasn't telling them that at all—it was merely telling them what was good for us.

"We are there, first, because a friendly nation has asked us for help against the Communist aggression," President Johnson solemnly declared in his State of the Union address on January 4, 1965. Ten weeks later, Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton, writing in the best style of the Pentagon systems analysts, offered a more accurate appraisal of "U.S. aims":

"Seventy per cent—To avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat (to our reputation as guarantor).

"Twenty per cent—To keep SVN (and the adjacent) territory from Chinese hands.

"Ten per cent—To permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer way of life.

"ALSO—To emerge from crisis without unacceptable taint from methods used.

"NOT—To 'help a friend,' although it would be hard

to stay in if asked out."

The attitude of American bureaucrats toward their official clients in Saigon was the lace curtain counterpart of the treatment dealt out to "dinks" and "slopes" and "gooks" by American soldiers in the field. Diem had once been celebrated by Lyndon Johnson as "the Churchill of Asia," but Hilsman's memo calling for his overthrow proposed that the United States "encourage the coup group to fight the battle to the end and to destroy the palace if necessary to gain victory." On November 1, 1963, when Diem's palace was under siege, he placed a pathetic last call to Ambassador Lodge, who preserved the icy dignity appropriate to a proconsul of Empire dealing with lesser breeds without the law. Diem asked what was "the attitude of the United States" toward the coup, and Lodge, who had been urging its support for many months, replied: "I do not feel well enough informed to be able to tell you. I have heard the shooting, but I am not acquainted with all the facts. Also it is 4:30 a.m. in Washington and the U.S. Government cannot possibly have a view." This exchange followed:

DIEM: But you must have some general ideas. After all, I am a chief of state. I have tried to do my duty. I want to do now what duty and good sense require. I believe in duty above all.

LODGE: You have certainly done your duty. As I told you this morning, I admire your courage and your great contributions to your country. No one can take away from you the credit for all you have. . . . If I can do anything for your physical safety, please call me.

We know that monstrous arrogance accrues to those who wield the vast power of the State without being held accountable to the people. As early as 1954—and as late as 1964—they seriously (and calmly) contemplated the possibility of using nuclear weapons in Indochina. They called their "conventional" bombing campaign "Rolling Thunder" and said it was "cheap." They disposed of mere mortals in the manner of Olympian gods. In the draft of his PLAN OF ACTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM on March 24, 1965, McNaughton wrote:

"It is essential—however badly SEA [Southeast Asia] may go over the next one to 3 years—that U.S. emerge as a 'good doctor.' We must have kept promises, been tough, taken risks, gotten bloodied, and hurt

the enemy very badly. We must avoid harmful appearances which will affect judgments by, and provide pretexts to, other nations regarding how the United States will behave in future cases of particular interest to those nations—regarding U.S. policy, power, resolve, and competence to deal with their problems."

Their game was power, and it was the only game worth playing. Taylor impatiently complained that "there was a danger of reasoning ourselves into inaction," the Pentagon historians recall. "From a military point of view," Taylor said, "the United States could function in Southeast Asia about as well as anywhere in the world except Cuba." Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy asserted that "basic doubts of the value of Southeast Asia and the importance of our stake there" could be disposed of by mounting an "urgent" public relations campaign. Walt Rostow, ever the effervescent optimist, assured Dean Rusk:

"I know well the anxieties and complications on our side of the line. But there may be a tendency to underestimate both the anxieties and complications on the other side and also to underestimate that limited but real margin of influence on the outcome that flows from the single fact that we are the greatest power in the world—if we behave like it."

Part of behaving like it, we know now, was to transform the language into something unrecognizable and unrelated to human beings. They wrote "scenarios" for "carrot-and-stick approaches" and for "progressive squeeze-and-talk" techniques. They planned "an orchestration of communications" and "a crescendo of additional military moves against infiltration targets." They "interdicted" and "defoliated" and carried out "surgical strikes" against "targets of opportunity." They issued "signals" and conducted "limited external actions" which carried a promise of "assured destruction." They coined a thesaurus of synonyms for death.

We know now that war crimes were committed in our names—not little war crimes of the kind for which we prosecute Lieutenant Calley and Captain Medina, but big war crimes like those for which we executed our fascist enemies only a quarter of a century ago. The Nuremberg Charter—*our* Nuremberg Charter—outlaws the "planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances." The Charter of the United Nations—*our* U.N. Charter—provides that parties to an international dispute must seek a solution by negotiation or other peaceful means, refraining from force or the threat of force.

We know now how and why and by whom a million people or more were destroyed. Only one major question remains unanswered, and the answer will not be found in further Pentagon disclosures, or in court proceedings, or even in Congressional investigations. It is a question we must answer for ourselves.

Now that we know what we know, what are we going to do?

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**"We know now that war crimes  
were committed in our names . . ."**

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# CHINA'S STRATEGIC SHIFT

by O. EDMUND CLUBB

A MAJOR transformation is taking place in the East Asian power confrontation. First, our Indochina War is reaching a critical stage: will peace really ensue, or will pursuit of American strategic objectives lead to a wider war, with new dangers? Second, Japan has established itself as a front-rank economic power and is accelerating its program of re-armament. Third, the Soviet Union is energetically expanding its economic and political ties with critical countries on the Asian periphery. Fourth, China, recently emerged from its tumultuous Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR), has embarked upon a new strategy in foreign affairs.

The fourth is not the least important of those developments. The strategy adopted by Peking will probably have a major impact on the future of Asia—perhaps of the world. The Chinese are not modest in their own claim of the importance of their governing concepts; Peking consistently purports to be the sole possessor, among the four major states engaged in the East Asian power quadrilateral, of the True Doctrine. It regularly castigates the United States as “imperialist,” Japan as “militarist,” and the USSR as “revisionist.”

Neither Chinese polemics nor Chinese political philosophy is a reliable guide to Peking's strategy, but the philosophy provides useful background. The time is especially opportune, for July 1 was the fiftieth birthday of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The occasion was to be viewed in the light of the dictum contained in the Party's new (1969) constitution: “Mao Tse-tung Thought is Marxism-Leninism of the era in which imperialism is heading for total collapse and socialism is advancing to world-wide victory.”

Just what is Maoism, and what meaning does it hold for the visible future?

Chinese Marxism-Leninism did not spring full-fledged from the brow of Mao Tse-tung—or of any other one Chinese leader. It is a complex compound of both Chinese and foreign elements, and men of a variety of political bents contributed to its evolution. But in the end it was Chairman Mao who finally fixed the Party's ideology as Orthodoxy, in the Thought of Mao Tse-tung.

One finds in that doctrine elements strongly suggestive of the ethnocentrism and universalism of Confucianism, the absolutism of ancient Legalism, and other Chinese thought patterns. Mao, like a number of other Chinese revolutionaries, was influenced by Russian anarchism even before becoming aware of Marxism.

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Maoism, like anarchism, is anti-elitist and opposed to the institutionalization of political power, contending that the revolutionary's immediate task is destruction. Then there is Marxism-Leninism, with the many possibilities which that revolutionary ideology holds for varying interpretations. And Mao himself is imbued with a voluntarist faith in the infinite capacity of man to dominate objective reality by the harnessing of subjective forces.

Mao as universalist is found contending that “the proletariat must emancipate not only itself but also mankind as a whole.” How? At the heart of Mao's thinking is his theory of contradictions, by which he holds that “changes in society are due chiefly to the development of the internal contradictions in society . . . it is the development of these contradictions that pushes society forward and gives the impetus for the supersession of the old society by the new.” And recent Chinese propaganda in particular has made clear that the new social order would have as its inspiration the Paris Commune of 1871. In a classless society, the people would be both workers and their own governors.

Given his conception of the operation of clashing forces in political life, Mao maintains a related theory of uninterrupted revolution (“permanent revolution,” in the Trotskyite phrase). He believes firmly that humanity can arrive at the ideal state of political perfection only by the way of revolutionary action. In China, after the Communist advent to power, he has progressively launched a variety of “movements” designed to achieve fundamental changes in the social structure. He also holds, quite naturally, that true Communists should actively “support” (a favorite Maoist verb—but an indefinite one) revolutionary processes throughout the world. He expressed his belief clearly in his discussion of “Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War,” an exposition made in 1936 in anticipation of the Sino-Japanese War:

“War,” he said, “is the highest form



of resolving contradictions, when they have developed to a certain stage, between classes, nations, states, or political groups . . ." Only with Utopian resolution of the matter will the process end: "When human society advances to the point where classes and states are eliminated, there will be no more wars . . . that will be the era of perpetual peace for mankind."

Mao therefore believes in the desirability of maintaining constant instability both at home and abroad, so that the flux of contradictions may maintain movement—and thus progress. This concept is closely related to another, military belief, as incorporated in Mao's doctrine of "protracted warfare." The doctrine envisages long-term "struggle"—almost inevitably by involved campaigns waged with shifting tactics to meet changing circumstances—until final victory is achieved.

There are other important components of Mao's basic philosophy. Trotsky held that "it is absurd to say that one cannot leap over stages." Mao also believes in the feasibility of making qualitative leaps over stages: His attempted Great Leap Forward of 1958 was a classic attempt to surmount historical stages of economic development by an act of the national will. With "politics in command," with "revolutionary spontaneity," with mobilization of the magic power of The Masses, the subjective—he thought—could overcome the objective. The massive effort failed, but Mao has never admitted to error in that regard. By Party definition, he is infallible.

Maoism, as now institutionalized, is not to be changed any more than the basic tenets of Confucianism were changed. But even as the Great Leap betrayed the boundless hopes of the Chairman, so did the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The Maoist personality cult fostered during the GPCR indeed was sustained, and bore some showy fruits, at the Party's 1969 (ninth) congress. That gathering took "unity" and "victory" as its watchwords, and purported to acclaim the complete success of the GPCR.

Notably, however, its membership had not been elected in accordance

with established procedure, but selected by "consultation." It was a rubber-stamp congress, created to condemn Mao Tse-tung's antagonists, and to celebrate "great leader Chairman Mao" and Maoism. Mao had achieved the overthrow and disgrace of his chief Party opponents, and won canonization for himself and his works, but the "victory" had been at great cost to Party, government, and nation. The cost factors of the GPCR were conveniently shelved, out of sight.

Out of sight, but not out of mind. In the course of that "Revolution," great violence had been done to the existing structure of Party philosophy and to the Communist rule. The seemingly monolithic Party had been shattered, government had been unhinged, and the Army, in effect, had assumed political authority. More than two years after the ninth congress the laborious reconstruction of Party and a new governmental apparatus is still not yet completed; whether the new forms will be as viable as the old remains to be proved.

Nor was the victory claimed in 1969 manifest in other fields. The country's third five-year plan, nominally begun in 1966 as the GPCR was getting under way, was frustrated by the political upheaval, as the second plan (1958-62) had been by the Great Leap. In foreign relations, China had fared even worse. Mao's expectation that the Third World would engage in revolutionary warfare in faithful adherence to the Chinese pattern was disappointed. Instead of flocking to the Maoist banner, Asian, African, and Latin American peoples had been alienated from China by the GPCR excesses. The country's foreign affairs generally were left in a shambles. Mao's illuminism had again proved inadequate as a philosophy for the governance of China. Experience had demonstrated once more that that vast country and the world too are more complex and that the processes of change are obdu-

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**"The existing situation points up the urgent need for change."**

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ately slower than Mao has believed.

The Maoist personality cult with its autocratic controls suffices to keep Mao's Thought enshrined and officially inviolate, but its revolutionary essence has been damped down. In March of this year, the hundredth anniversary of the Paris Commune was prominently celebrated by the Chinese official press, but there was no visible tendency on Peking's part to revive the Paris Commune experiments undertaken—briefly—at Shanghai and Peking in the course of the GPCR.

The millenium has been delayed. It has apparently been realized that retardation of the Chinese economy, in an era of sharp international antagonisms, presents a greater danger to China's future than does the ideological deviationism of dissidents from Maoism. It is now being remembered that, early in the Communist rule, Mao himself proposed that China should become a major economic power by the year 2000. Peking therefore finds it desirable, after all the slogans are shouted, to turn to pragmatic procedures in the arduous task of working to that end. It is probably not without due regard for the disruption of the second and third five-year plans by great Maoist "movements" that the fourth five-year plan was launched (even if not spelled out in its particulars) in 1971; and it is highly probable that elitist planning and management will be enlisted for its execution. "Revolutionary spontaneity" is not enough.

In Peking's administration of foreign affairs, lip service is still paid to Maoist revolutionism. On the occasion of May Day, Peking's three leading official periodicals carried a joint editorial entitled LONG LIVE THE GREAT UNITY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD! Quoting Mao Tse-tung to the effect that "revolution is the main trend in the world today," and asserting that "the Chinese people are marching forward shoulder to shoulder with the revolutionary people the world over in the struggle against imperialism, revisionism and the reactionaries," the editorial stressed a final exhortation: "People of the world, unite and defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs!"

And yet, that same document was



found citing Mao Tse-tung as sanction for the idea that China should "unite with all forces that can be united, the enemy excepted," and should strive for peaceful coexistence with countries having different social systems, on the basis of the Five (Bandung) Principles—one of which provides for non-interference in other countries' internal affairs. Under Mao's messianic direction, the Chinese People's Republic had trapped itself in a contradictory political position. By proposing to foster world revolution, China found itself isolated—in a situation where it needed improved relations with other countries, practically all of which were governed by either capitalist, bourgeois, or "revisionist" Communist regimes.

The existing situation points up the urgent need for change. Asia is truly a revolutionary continent, but the revolution is attended by dangerous forces:

- In the widening Indochina War, China has become more deeply involved—on the side of the revolutionaries.

- The clash between West and East Pakistan not only introduces imponderables into Pakistan's own future; the flow of refugees into India threatens to aggravate relations between India and West Pakistan. Here, for Peking, state-to-state relations clearly take precedence over Mao's urge to further Communist revolutions. For the present turmoil promises to offer China new political opportunities having nothing to do with Marxism-Leninism, since China supports West Pakistan and India backs East Pakistan.

- Japan's buildup of its military forces is a development which clearly was not anticipated by Peking even as late as 1965. Peking obviously has less chance now than before of putting a Maoist imprint on Tokyo's policy. Further, the projected return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty in 1972, and the attendant probability that it will be proposed, in some American military circles, to build up the American position on Formosa as a substitute link in the chain of military encirclement of China, introduce yet another imponderable into the equation.

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**"Maoism, as now institutionalized, is not to be changed . . ."**

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- If the United States is found to be in grave difficulty in Asia, American military strength is nevertheless far greater than China's own, and therein lies a potential threat to China for so long as the present confrontation continues.

Finally, there is the challenge to China's program arising from Moscow's "revisionist" approach to the contest for world power: Moscow subverts the Chinese strategy of fostering world revolution by Soviet wooing of bourgeois governments. The Soviet leaders, in effect, propose to wait upon the efforts of bourgeois leaders of Third World countries to become more radical under the dual impact of domestic distress and international exploitation and to proceed with all due deliberation toward the next stage (in Marxist theory) of social development, the dictatorship of the proletariat. In an important sense, the Soviet Russians have proved more "Asian" than the Chinese, more patient, more cunning in strategy and maneuver.

In the light of so many danger-charged developments, the Chinese Communist Party leadership has evidently decided upon a fresh strategic approach. There has been a return, in the field of foreign affairs, to sobriety and the Bandung policy of peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation which was followed by Peking in the mid-1950s.

In practice, Peking no longer strives, as it did back in 1965, to form a revolutionary International of Third World countries for an early assault on the rich, industrialized countries of the world. China has begun to expand its relations with "bourgeois" governments instead of working for their overthrow. Peking's polemics against "revisionism" continue, in service of the doctrine of Mao's infallibility, but China's ties with revisionist Yugoslavia and Rumania are knitted closer, and

both peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation (in terms of a growing trade) have been built up with the USSR since Chinese and Soviet diplomats returned to the negotiating table in Peking in October, 1969. Fulminations against "Japanese militarism" flow unabated, but Sino-Japanese trade continues to expand.

The shift in strategy has even had an initial effect on the hostile Sino-American relationship. Premier Chou En-lai charmed those who attended the 1955 Bandung Conference; he has now charmed a visiting American ping pong team and a series of other visitors. It is as if his charm had affected a nation, and Washington has cautiously relaxed restrictions on trade with "Red" China. But the thaw is manifestly only superficial. Where Peking regularly curses "U.S. imperialism," there is less reason than in other propaganda fields to doubt its words. For it is bound by national interest as well as ideology to remain antagonistic toward a country that supports the Nationalist faction on Formosa and maintains a threatening array of military power in East and Southeast Asia for the "containment" of China.

The Vietnam papers published by *The New York Times* make it abundantly clear, if it were not obvious before from the statements of assorted Secretaries of State and Defense, that the United States has been making war in Indochina as part of a plan to encircle China with a cordon of fire and steel, and was entirely prepared, at least on a "contingency" basis, for any military confrontation with China that might arise from the Indochina War, a war that still continues.

In summary, as the Chinese Communist Party celebrates its fiftieth birthday, Peking, bound *de jure* to Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary policies, has *de facto* undertaken pragmatically to consolidate and strengthen the national political and economic structure, and in the foreign field, to win greater influence by the quite unrevolutionary tactics associated with the Bandung policy. There is little probability that Mao's revolutionism will

be resumed again in his lifetime. Peking's shift in domestic and foreign strategy promises to make the country notably stronger in the decades ahead. By reaching agreements with a number of countries, since late 1970, for the establishment of diplomatic relations, China has already substantially enhanced its chances of becoming a full member of the organized world community, the United Nations. The situation is less uniform with respect to the matter of China's relations with the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States, the three other states making up the Asian great-power quadrilateral, but here certain results can be tentatively forecast:

ONE—Although *inter-party* polemics will continue (at least, for Chairman Mao's lifetime), some further improvement in the *state-to-state* relations between China and the USSR is to be expected.

TWO—Given China's real fear of a powerful renaissance of the Oriental neighbor defiant of Mao Tse-tung Thought, Chinese animadversions against "Japanese militarism" will probably continue unabated. But it is to be anticipated that the actual course of the Sino-Japanese relationship will reflect, in part, developments in the Japanese-American alliance and, in part, the exigent Chinese economic needs, for the maintenance of an uneasy balance for the time being.

THREE—The Sino-American relationship will remain basically hostile in character, until there is either the termination of the Indochina War and major reduction of the American military presence in the West Pacific, or abandonment by Peking of its strategic aim of ejecting the American presence from East Asia, or both. Neither is to be viewed as categorically promised for the visible future. The Sino-American confrontation of the past two decades remains basically in being. The first small steps have been taken to relax the confrontation, and that is all.

But, on the CCP's fiftieth birthday, the Chinese People's Republic stands revealed in a new and impressive guise, and circumstances demand that the rest of the world take due note of the change.

# The Abandoned Cities

by JAMES B. STEELE

THE WARNINGS have come for years. Now comes the visible, disquieting sign that many of the nation's great cities—the ones that figured so much in the "urban crisis" rhetoric of the 1960s—are indeed dying.

Thousands of housing units are being abandoned by landlords in cities like New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia. The process has speeded up so dramatically, a recent national report warned, that it threatens to create "ghost towns" of central cities.

Few sights raise more doubts about the ultimate survival of urban civilization than the haunting, desolate, boarded-up, or burned out dwellings of East New York, Cleveland's Hough, or the North Philadelphia ghetto. Mayor Kevin White of Boston looked despairingly at the abandoned remains of the Brownsville section of Brooklyn on a recent bus tour with big city mayors and remarked sadly that the area "may be the first tangible sign of the collapse of our civilization."

Conservative estimates put the number of abandoned units in New York at more than 100,000. In Philadelphia, largely a city of single family row houses, about 25,000 units stand vacant. Chicago, St. Louis, and Cleveland all report a problem of similar scope. In varying degrees, abandonment is touching most older, large cities in the East and Middle West.

After surveying seven cities in a na-

tional study of abandonment, the National Urban League and the Washington-based Center for Community Change came to the grim conclusion that "the central cities of the nation's metropolitan areas are as a whole at some stage of the abandonment process."

What is causing this abandonment? Generally, the answer lies deep in the nation's post World War II experience, in the familiar legacy wrought by the influx of poor blacks into central cities and the national movement to the suburbs at the cities' expense. Even more significantly, abandonment reflects the fact that the nation has yet to mount a real attack on poverty and that all the social programs of the 1960s failed to help millions of poor Americans. Indeed, many experts sifting through the rubble of the slums conclude that the poor are worse off today than they were ten years ago.

Landlords are abandoning old housing because it no longer produces the rent to cover maintenance, mortgage payments, and taxes. Those costs have soared in recent years without an offsetting increase in rents. Nor can the poor pay more; they already pay a higher percentage of their income for housing than the affluent. So what was once a slumlord's bounty is now a bitter harvest, and many property owners are getting out of the inner city as fast as possible.

The notion of landlords fleeing the central city would once have been a cause for rejoicing in many a poor neighborhood. But today, the turn-

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about has caught cities unprepared and ill-equipped. The systematic decline in private ownership has left a vacuum no bankrupt city can fill. And no mechanism exists at the Federal level to help transfer housing into the hands of potential owner occupants or community groups. Since no other landlord is likely to want to invest in slum areas today, the only alternative for those owners who foresee economic suicide ahead is to board up their property and walk away.

Abandonment is removing thousands of housing units from the low income market during one of the nation's most acute housing shortages. One of the mysteries to many housing officials is where displaced families are going. The continuing flight of whites from most central cities to the suburbs is opening up some additional housing for minority families. A few such families move into other slum dwellings almost as deteriorated as the ones they left. But some find their only alternative is to enter public housing, often an ugly apartment in a high rise brick or concrete canyon that has become synonymous with crime.

The sight of a vacant house or apartment building in older sections of large cities is not new. In the past, abandonment has served as a kind of natural process in cities, removing the oldest, most dilapidated houses from the market. Now a different kind of abandonment is sweeping through central cities, infecting good, relatively sound housing as well as bad.

The problem dates back to the late 1940s when millions of poor black rural Americans began pouring into central cities, taking up residence in old homes and neighborhoods that had housed generations of immigrants before them. Displaced by the mechanization of agriculture in the South, many blacks hoped to find work and a new life in the North—the same dream that had motivated millions of Irish, Italian, and Eastern European immigrants.

But the new immigrants—as America came to recognize painfully in the 1960s—found a changed central city, one that could no longer provide a job and a future for a man trying to

claw his way out of poverty. The old cities were losing their historic role of providing unskilled, manufacturing jobs to new immigrants. Those jobs were being transferred to new plants in the suburbs or were disappearing altogether. Most new work in the city was in service industries, largely for white collar and clerical employees, and it was concentrated downtown in sleek office towers.

All the while these changes eroded the economic base of old central cities, realty interests were playing a brutal and ruthless game in white working class neighborhoods by capitalizing on fears of racial change. By block busting, many realtors transformed whole sections of central cities into absentee-owned, landlord-ruled compounds in which home ownership—long recognized as a stabilizing and positive force—was a rarity.

As poverty and social problems multiplied in the core of the city, financial institutions became more unwilling to approve mortgages for buying or repairing homes there. The way was cleared for the collapse of the private market. First, a few owners began to pull out, leaving boarded-up houses behind. Once that happened, the typical neighborhood began to slide downhill. An abandoned house becomes a haven for drug addicts, gangs, and crime—an unmistakable symbol of a neighborhood on the way down.

Once begun, the process begins to take on a life of its own, spreading far beyond the worst slums to other neighborhoods. "They grow, they fester, they leap across a street through a backyard to the block on the other side," is how Edward J. Logue, president of New York state's Urban De-

velopment Corporation, describes the way abandoned housing spreads.

In Philadelphia, where abandonment became a political issue in the city's May primary in which the nation's "number one tough cop," Frank L. Rizzo, won the Democratic nomination for mayor, abandoned housing is spreading into once stable, white working class areas. Although part of the reason is slipshod administration of the city's urban renewal program, a key factor is the apparent loss of faith in some neighborhoods disclosed by lending institutions.

The Urban League's study of seven cities reported that the "impetus to withdraw residential investment capital from black or potentially black areas within central cities has created a situation in which the viability of the cities as a whole must be questioned." A leading student of abandonment, Rutgers University professor George Sternlieb, calls the private withdrawal in part a "crisis of confidence in the future of the city."

Nowhere is abandonment more intense and daily life more agonizing than in the heart of the slums, in what the Urban League and Center for Community Change described as the "crisis ghetto." To these organizations, the term means "a slum in which not only are the residents all poor and members of a minority group and the housing deteriorated; but also an area in which individual and family incomes are declining while indices of social pathology are rising."

Not many years ago, North Philadelphia, now the home of 300,000 of the city's 700,000 blacks and Philadelphia's worst ghetto, was a quiet, pleasant section of the "City of Brotherly Love." Handsome brick row-houses stood along narrow, tree-lined streets. Street cars crisscrossed at intersections and transported passengers to all parts of the city. Today, whole blocks are vacant, and glass and rubble line the streets.

Shirley Spencer, a tall, twenty-one-year-old black woman with two small children, lives in a dingy four-room apartment in North Philadelphia, in a neighborhood pockmarked by abandonment. For months her landlord has refused to make repairs to bursting



Fischetti in Chicago Daily News

### Domestic Dominoes



pipes and crumbling walls; he suggests that she move. The last few times she called to complain about the house, she could not even get through to the owner. In effect, the building is abandoned.

Before she goes to the corner store, Shirley Spencer pulls back a rotting curtain from the window of the front door and checks the abandoned house across the street. She is making sure that the Oxford street gang members are not hanging out in front. If they are, she waits until they leave. She does not want to be pulled into the house the way a friend of hers was recently.

On the second floor of Shirley's building, sixteen-year-old Clarence Williams watches out the window, too. He is biding his time until he leaves for the country and a job training camp. Three months ago, the gang, one of perhaps 100 in the city's ghetto areas, began to harass Clarence, a thin, bespectacled, ascetic-looking youth, for reasons he does not understand. His mother enrolled him in the job camp outside the city for his own safety. Her fear was real; gang violence has taken more than 100 lives in the last three years.

While minority groups, overall, may have improved their living standards in recent years, many of those left behind in the North Philadelphia of this country—Daniel Patrick Moynihan notwithstanding—clearly appear to be worse off than a few years ago. "Poverty actually is increasing in the crisis ghettos," the Urban League study claimed. It cited a special 1965 census in Cleveland which showed that real income has declined in those areas previously known as the hard-core ghetto.

Persistent unemployment, a lack of public transportation to get to new suburban blue collar jobs, and rising crime rates exist today. Welfare rolls in New York now top the million mark. In Philadelphia, the welfare rolls recently passed the 300,000 figure, one out of every seven of the city's population. Boston dispenses aid to one in five of its citizens.

Part of the rise in the rolls may reflect a new attitude toward welfare—that it is a right, not a privilege. Part reflects rising unemployment generally. But statistics coming out of the U.S. Census Bureau this year disclosed that the number of black families headed by women rose sharply in the 1960s—a clear indication to many authorities that deepening poverty is causing social and family conditions to deteriorate even further in America's ghettos.

Cities are hopelessly outflanked by the abandonment process. Philadelphia prides itself in having the most ambitious program in the nation for rehabilitating abandoned houses. In the last four years the city has restored 6,100 units to the market. But this figure has not kept pace with the speed of abandonment. And the program does not even attempt to deal with the question of how to stop abandonment by landlords.

For every unit vacant in the slums today, there are three or four or more units that may be only days, weeks, or months away from the same fate. Physical abandonment is only the last step in a long process. As George Sternlieb of Rutgers put it: "The process of physical abandonment is preceded by psychological and fiscal abandonment." What that means, in human terms, is that poor inner city minorities for the most part are living in absolute squalor, in old, dilapidated housing built for a generation of immigrants seventy-five or 100 years ago. The advanced stage of abandonment lends credence to the cries of community leaders that the quality of old housing is getting far worse.

As in most cities, the public housing waiting list in Philadelphia has mushroomed—from 6,500 applicants four years ago to 13,000 today. Considering the fact that almost no families want to live in public housing if they have any other choice, that is a clear indication of the extent of the housing shortage. City housing officials in Philadelphia readily admit that the size of the waiting list might double or triple if better public housing were available.

There are no easy answers. One possibility for easing abandonment suggested by experts calls for massive governmental intervention in the central

city home mortgage and home loan improvement market. Government support in these areas could promote home ownership by owner-occupants or community groups, thus saving the dwelling before abandonment. Equally important, such support could provide funds for rehabilitation or repair.

Significantly, the Urban League study found that in cities such as Atlanta and Detroit—both with substantial home ownership and economic class integration in the central core—the abandonment problem was far less severe than in cities such as St. Louis. The report gave much of the credit for this positive force in Detroit and Atlanta to the fact that "mortgage lending institutions have refused to panic and social and criminal problems are less overwhelming."

National attention has recently begun to focus on the problem. A U.S. Senate committee, for the first time, set aside a full day for testimony on abandonment during hearings last summer on the 1970 Housing Act. Partly as an outgrowth of that meeting, Congress authorized a paltry \$20 million in grants to cities where the abandonment problem was acute.

In the final analysis, however, abandonment must be viewed as more than a housing crisis, even though that fact alone is causing deep concern. It is the telltale and ominous sign of trouble festering at the heart of American society—of inequality and poverty and racism that have left millions of submerged Americans without hope for the smallest share in this country's affluence.

The last few years have seen many cities breathing easier as "long hot summers" passed without outbreaks. Some city officials are convinced that the large-scale disorders of the 1960s will not recur. But all the conditions that sparked the riots are still there, and in many cases have grown worse. There is little point in conjecturing just when disorder might break out. If we assumed it would happen tomorrow, we might not be far off the mark—and more important, this might inspire the country to act constructively to save the cities.



# Has Common Cause Developed Any Clout?

by WILLIAM CHAPMAN

**I**N ANY analysis of the anti-war movement of recent years, two truisms stand out: One, there is a surplus of well-meaning statements and urgent calls to action. Two, there is a shortage of political clout.

There is a superfluity of organizations devoted to ending the war, establishing "new priorities," and setting this country on the road to prosperity, peace, and equal opportunity for all citizens. But few of them have any understanding of what it takes to translate these lofty goals into votes where they most immediately count—in Congress. It is not simply a paradox when the Gallup Poll records that three out of four Americans oppose the war, and the U.S. Senate, afire with anti-war fervor for two years, nevertheless turns down the McGovern-Hatfield amendment. It represents a fundamental failure of the peace movement and allied groups to move the "system" to the position desired by a vast majority of citizens.

It is this kind of imbalance that Common Cause, the citizens' lobby organized by former Health, Education and Welfare Secretary John Gardner, is striving to rearrange. Votes, it insists, are what count. Citizens can exert pressure to influence or change votes. They need only to be convinced which votes need to be changed on which issues.

"Only one person can end the war—you," declared the message presented by Common Cause in scores of newspaper advertisements.

But has it worked? Is Common

Cause really a new political phenomenon capable of backing up its high-sounding phrases with voter activism? Or is it simply another amalgamation of do-gooders, blessed with money and an appealing leader?

The evidence at this point suggests that Common Cause does indeed have clout. It has developed a sophistication in grass-roots organization that never existed outside of political parties, a few business-oriented pressure groups, and labor unions. It has begun to organize a highly influential, largely affluent, and previously silent corps of citizens into a national lobby of serious proportions. Common Cause is not switching masses of votes overnight on Capitol Hill, but it is, through a growing network of citizen-lobbyists, putting enough heat on a "swing" group of Congressmen to make a noticeable difference.

The clearest test came this spring on a campaign, little noted by the media, to induce members of the House to sign either of two "statements of purpose" pledging themselves to strive for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam by the end of this year. Neither statement has the force of law; each one merely represents a public intent by the signers. A Republican statement was circulated early this year by Representative Charles Mosher of Ohio and other Republicans; a Democratic statement was passed

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WILLIAM CHAPMAN is a national affairs editor of The Washington Post.

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around by Representative Thomas A. ("Tip") O'Neill of Massachusetts, the majority whip and some of his middle-of-the-road colleagues.

The most revealing record is that chalked up by O'Neill's Democratic statement. Common Cause's lobbyists and grass-roots campaigners launched a major effort to align Democratic Congressmen with that anti-war position. On April 20, when the Common Cause campaign began in earnest, the statement had seventy-four signers, primarily those Congressmen whose disgust with the war in Vietnam had been publicly pronounced. By June 16, the number had risen to 121 Democrats, seven short of a party majority and twenty-one more than the number who had supported a similar measure in the House Democratic Caucus last winter. The increase came mainly from middle-of-the-road House members who never had bothered to register their views, pro or con, on the war.

Of the seventeen Democrats targeted by Common Cause, eight had signed up by the middle of June. By the testimony of several Congressmen, Common Cause had at least called their attention to the O'Neill resolution; none would admit categorically that Common Cause's constituents had pushed them over the border line. But a spokesman for O'Neill said: "We suddenly started getting all these calls from people [Congressmen] asking, 'What the hell is this statement all about? I'm getting these calls and telegrams and I don't even know what you're up to.'"

Knowing "what you're up to" is at least half the battle on Capitol Hill. It was precisely this action that Common Cause performed most ably—alerting members that a new movement was underway and forcing them to take an interest. Signing a statement or voting for an amendment is inevitably the result of a variety of forces for any Congressman. But getting him interested in the first place is a major achievement for any lobbying group. That, unquestionably, Common Cause



had done in a number of instances.

The track record of the Republican resolution is less persuasive. Only twenty-one Republicans had signed Mosher's statement by June 15. But the comments of several GOP members is instructive. Typical was this observation by Representative Marvin L. Esch of Michigan, one of the original sponsors, with Mosher, of the Republican "statement of purpose": "I've heard from several Congressmen who said that the faucets were turned on in their districts by the Common Cause people."

From these and interviews with a score or more of other Congressmen, one can distill this: The pressure brought by Common Cause did not spin a large number of House members around in their tracks. It is impossible to pin down anyone who admits categorically that he publicly changed his position on Vietnam because of the Common Cause-generated campaigns in his district. But many Representatives, for the first time, admitted that they were forced to think through and finally express their opposition because a new element of their constituency made their opinions felt.

The Congressmen felt the pressures in a variety of ways: Prominent people in their districts wrote, telegraphed, or presented in person their deeply-felt opinion that the war had gone on far too long and that the only practical way to end it was to set a final date for U.S. troop withdrawals.

Perhaps most important is the new

source of this expression of opinion. Congressmen interviewed said, almost without exception, that they were hearing from a new element of their constituency. They heard from people who, to the Congressmen's knowledge, had not previously expressed opinions on the war. The new voices were representative of upper-middle-class, well-educated people who were participating in politics for the first time. Some were Democrats, some were Republicans, and a large number were independents.

The experience of Representative William S. Broomfield, a moderate Republican from well-to-do suburban Detroit, is representative. Most of the mail Broomfield received urging him to sign Mosher's resolution came from the affluent end of his district, the Birmingham-Bloomfield area which is composed of upper-income families. He received between 200 and 300 letters urging him to sign the Mosher statement, most of them from people never active previously in politics.

"Most of the letters I got were quite objective," Broomfield recalls. "There was none of the hard sell about it. I considered them very effective." He claims he would have signed the statement anyway, although nothing in his record indicates he is the sort of Republican who would buck the national leadership to sign anything implying criticism of the White House. (The Republican House leadership, including Minority Leader Gerald Ford of Michigan, made a modest attempt to dissuade GOP Congressmen from signing Mosher's statement.)

The type of pressures brought by Common Cause's constituency was best summed up by Representative Esch, also a moderate Republican with no record of opposing the Nixon Administration: "They are people who are analytical, more knowledgeable and sophisticated than your normal letter-writers. Any Congressman can tell from his mail when the usual pressure groups are engaged in a concerted campaign. You always know when labor or the Chamber [of Commerce] or some environmental group has sent out a newsletter. This isn't that type of campaign. They [Common Cause] have been able to reach out and iden-

tify the real opinion leaders in many districts—the people I call the 'diffusers'—people who can influence large segments of the population."

The origin of such pressures was no haphazard operation. Rather, it consisted of one of the most sophisticated and closely-targeted campaigns run from Washington in recent years. Early in the spring, Gardner's group pin-pointed about fifty districts for special attention, zeroing in on the Representatives who had never expressed an opinion on the war before but who might be susceptible to concerted public pressures. For the most part the Congressmen were from suburban districts.

In Common Cause's plush, modern headquarters in downtown Washington, an old-fashioned "boiler room" was set up. Twelve hours a day, volunteers would man the telephones in shifts, calling citizens in the targeted districts who had indicated by public pledges (and by paying fifteen dollars in annual dues) that they subscribed to Gardner's views.

A typical conversation went like this: "This is Jeanette Smith of Common Cause in Washington. We wonder if you would try to get your Congressman to sign the Mosher statement. Mosher, M-o-s-h-e-r. He's a Congressman from Ohio. It's to end the war in Indochina. . . . We'd like Congressman Conte to go on record by signing Mosher's statement. Will you help? Thanks very much." (Representative Silvio Conte ultimately signed the statement.)

The tightly-organized phone campaign was established by the political consulting firm headed by Matt Reese, a recognized expert in mass persuasion. By mid-June, the telephone calls had reached more than 10,000 people. Each person was urged to call five friends in his district and ask them to make similar appeals to their Congressman. Common Cause's scoreboard showed that ninety per cent of the 10,000 persons reached by telephone agreed to register their personal views with their Congressman. A slightly smaller proportion agreed to call five friends. According to one Matt Reese organizer, "That's the

# moving?

be sure to give us your old address as well as the new —and please include both ZIP Codes.

**The PROGRESSIVE**  
Madison, Wisconsin 53703



highest percentage I've ever seen in any campaign."

Throughout this period, Common Cause itself was growing at a rapid rate. By the middle of June, about 175,000 people had responded to Gardner's advertisements—and Gardner was forced to deny Republican National Committee charges that he was running for President. Outside of such recognized lobbies as labor, the Chamber of Commerce, and the like, Common Cause now qualifies as one of the largest mass-membership lobbies operating in and out of Washington.

Common Cause, like most lobbies, exaggerates its influence. For example, it claims Representative Kenneth J. Gray, Illinois Democrat, as a convert, but Gray says he was led to sign the Democratic statement of purpose by the urgings of "Tip" O'Neill, whose position as Democratic whip lends a certain extra persuasion. Gray said he has received only "five or six letters" from people in his Southern Illinois district who could be identified as Common Cause advocates. Similarly, Representative Florence Dwyer, New Jersey Republican, is claimed as a Common Cause convert, but she insists that her signing of the Mosher statement was a natural conversion due to her growing anti-war sentiment. Still, her staff acknowledges a flood of mail from upper-income areas.

"They're smart and they're doing all of the right things," said one of Representative Dwyer's aides. "It's not boiler-plate stuff we're getting. Generally, we're getting short notes and well-reasoned letters. A lot of them are from businessmen and professional people. There are a lot of new names on the list."

One of the most curious examples is Jerry Pettis, a Republican Congressman from the very conservative Southern California district of San Bernardino county—who, incidentally, was supported in his first campaign for Congress in 1966 by Richard M. Nixon. Pettis was reliably reported to have agreed to sign the original Mosher statement; some sources say he was then induced by Minority Leader Ford to remove his name. Pettis's aides deny this, but they do acknowledge a vast

assortment of mail from previously unheard-of constituents who urged him to sign. In the end, he refused.

Representative Charles J. Carney, Ohio Democrat, is another Congressman chalked up as a Common Cause victory. His was a Common Cause target district early in the spring, and by early April Carney wrote to a constituent: "After a great deal of soul-searching, I have decided to support Congressman O'Neill's statement of purpose calling for a total withdrawal of American troops by December 31, 1971." Carney acknowledges receiving a certain amount of Common Cause-generated mail from his district, but he denies that he was pressured by the letter writers into signing O'Neill's statement.

Common Cause's objective in stimulating the letter-writing campaign was not merely to advance a "statement of purpose" in the House. The goal was to place on record a solid corps of Congressmen who could be counted on to vote for specific amendments to military appropriations that would curtail the Administration's legal and financial capacity to wage war in Indochina after the end of this year. It is clear that not all of those who signed the statements were prepared to vote for specific cuts in military funds. Even Representative Daniel Rostenkowski, Illinois Democrat and an original co-sponsor of the O'Neill statement, said he did not feel committed to voting for specific cuts.

From this experience in the spring and summer of 1971, one can draw several somewhat ambiguous conclusions. Common Cause is no revolutionary movement capable of transforming Congressional politics overnight. No great national groundswell was generated by the organization's intensive efforts. At the same time, however, significant pressures were brought to bear on that most ponderous and conservative branch of government, the House of Representatives. John Gardner rightly observed recently that one of the most difficult tasks of any citizens' movement would be to "flush out" the Congressman who, in the past, has been reluctant to take a stand on the major issues of our times. One

can say that the process has begun and that Common Cause played some significant role in the flushing-out.

There are two significant trends which suggest more possibilities in the future. First, Common Cause has in these months of its infancy managed to grow to a sizable membership, one large enough to guarantee attention for some years to come. It has organized a unique constituency of affluent, normally uninvolved Americans. As one of its lobbyists explained: "These are the people who can pick up their telephone and get their Congressman on the line with very little effort." It will take time to get the messages through those lines, but Common Cause seems particularly well structured to remain in business and to attain enough influence to activate some of the movers and shakers—the "diffusers"—of middle-class society.

Second, there are fundamental changes taking place in the House which will make its members more vulnerable to precisely the kind of pressure Common Cause can generate. It is now possible, for the first time in many years, for ordinary members of the House to request and obtain a recorded teller vote on amendments to key legislation. The stark fact is that until the middle of June, 1971, the House never had taken a significant *recorded* vote on any legislative amendments affecting the expenditures for the war in Vietnam. But it is now customary for between 375 and 400 members to be "flushed out" for votes on such amendments; previously, they were able to dodge them. They are now exposed, out in the open where their names are tallied and their votes can be reported to the voters in their home districts.

In this kind of arena, an organization such as Common Cause is able to apply pressures and check the results. The "citizens' lobby" may not seem important to academicians or casual students of American government, but to those who work in the Congressional vineyards it represents major progress. It will be interesting to see what Common Cause can harvest in the months to come.



# THE PEOPLE'S FORUM



ing, however, and that's obfuscation. Nonetheless, as editor, you are entitled to continue to believe that Mayer is one of the really great writers of our times—a point with which I am sure Mayer agrees.

WILLIAM H. FISHER  
Professor of Education  
University of Montana  
Missoula, Montana

## Is Mayer Just Ordinary?

Dear Sirs:

In The People's Forum of a recent issue, Hortense Miller severely criticized Milton Mayer for his position on the role of women. She wrote: "Mr. Mayer sneers with pettiness, sheer meanness, and hatred towards half the human race."

I share the views expressed by Hortense Miller. Mr. Mayer used to be an ideal on a high pedestal. Once or twice before, he began slipping—when he referred to his wife and to women as "sex-objects"—but his latest tirade against women who ask for equal treatment with men completed my disillusionment. I fear his place on my pedestal will never again be so high up. Is he, after all, just an ordinary man with feet of clay?

JEAN WUNDERLICH  
San Diego, California

## Dispute Lens on Middle East

Dear Sirs:

I found Sidney Lens' "Letter from Kuwait" in the June issue a sometimes myopic and often exasperating report of Middle Eastern life. The sum total of the report on the Symposium is that two standards exist in this world: one for Israel, one for everybody else.

For example, the majority of those present at the Symposium were opposed to the existence of Israel as a "Jewish" state. Question: were they also opposed to the existence of Islamic states? Islam is the official state religion of the Arab nations; why should a different standard be applied to Israel?

Lens states that the "Palestinian Arab has as much right to come home . . . as a Jew had to return to Judengasse in Vienna after the defeat of Hitler." I find his statement peculiarly myopic. Unless I misread history, a state of war has existed between the Arab states and Israel for the last twenty-three years. It is a warped perception that equates the Jew with Hitler. I am also concerned with the failure of

## Where Was Congress?

Dear Sirs:

Not all the blame for the secrecy and deceit practiced by the Presidents—as revealed in the Pentagon Papers—should be put on them alone. What about Congress? Where was it through all these years? Asleep at the switch? True, some of our legislators did speak out, and they got very little support from the others. Perhaps the time has come to clean out the stables.

G. WINN  
New York, New York

## Disturbed by Dr. Halleck

Dear Sirs:

I was rather saddened by the article by Dr. Seymour Halleck, "A Psychiatrist Looks at the Uses of Abnormality," in the June issue of *The Progressive*.

Considering Dr. Halleck's training and position one would hope that he would not find it necessary to write such a distorted and—to many present and future patients in psychotherapy and psychoanalysis—disturbing article.

As a practicing psychoanalyst for more than thirty years I can assure Dr. Halleck and your readers that our profession is not out to label patients for label's sake, but it is our responsibility to make a proper diagnosis to enable ourselves to help the patient to resolve the problems which have brought him into our office in the first place. The making of a diagnosis is not always an easy task but for a well trained and experienced psychiatrist it does not present unsurmountable difficulties. It is certainly not done in a slipshod manner except by irresponsible practitioners, whom we find in our profession, unfortunately, as well as in all others.

Dr. Halleck must know that responsible representatives of our profession are motivated only to help the patient to find himself and enable him to live as auton-

omous and satisfactory a life as he wishes and is capable of, irrespective of his or her being a homosexual, a revolutionary, or a member of any minority or oppressed group.

HANS H. COHN, M.D.  
Suffern, New York

## Dr. Halleck Replies

Dear Sirs:

It was not my intention to impugn the motivations of the majority of practicing psychiatrists. Rather, I was trying to emphasize that there are factors inherent in the process of psychiatric diagnosis and treatment which can have unanticipated effects upon both patients and the public. Psychiatrists are part of a social system and whether they intend to or not, they have an impact upon that system. Every diagnosis, every type of psychiatric treatment, including psychotherapy, has an impact upon the distribution of power between the patient and his family and between the patient and his community.

Neither psychiatrists nor the public have been sufficiently aware of the political impact of the psychiatrist's work. My purpose is to try to help clarify the very real influence the psychiatrist has on either altering or changing the status quo even when his motivations are purely humanitarian and scientific.

SEYMOUR L. HALLECK, M.D.  
Professor of Psychiatry  
University of Wisconsin  
Madison, Wisconsin

## Mayer No Liberal

Dear Sirs:

I am pleased that some of your women readers have caught up with Milton Mayer—and have exposed him as *not* being a real liberal. Some of us have long been aware of this fact.

Mayer is a master of one quality in writ-



Lens and of the Arabs to point out that at the time of the establishment of Israel, an independent Palestinian state was set up on the west bank of the Jordan. Everybody talks about Israel "expansionism" but it was the Jordanians who destroyed the proposed Palestinian state.

I am also concerned about the peculiar "revolutionary socialism" of the Middle East which—Lens did point out—sees in the destruction of Israel the solution of most Arab problems. To my perception, the most revolutionary part of the Middle East is Israel. It is not a perfect state; no state is. But if it is compared to the militaristic, totalitarian, monolithic structures around it—including the one-party systems of Egypt and Libya—it comes out looking like a Utopian dream.

If the Israeli treatment of the Palestinian Arabs is wrong, then what does one say of the treatment of Jews in Morocco, in Iraq, in Egypt, and Libya? I suggest that there is something astigmatic in a view that sees an improvement in the lives of eighty million poor through the alteration—however drastic—of one state with two million. Focusing on Israel as the problem is not revolutionary; it is the most blatant kind of reactionary scapegoating.

I, too, am as concerned as Lens about the Middle East. I am concerned about social justice and social change. But does that hodge-podge of "revolutionaries" have no problems to solve other than Israel? Just as starters, when the Arab nations confront the Israeli government, with a woman as prime minister, shouldn't they wonder about the elimination of slavery and the emancipation of women in their own revolutionary, humanitarian, democratic states?

MYRON TAUBE  
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Dear Sirs:

Sidney Lens, in his "Letter from Kuwait," disqualifies himself as an objective reporter in a number of instances—to mention only one will suffice. He mentions one Israeli "atrocities" without any qualifying circumstances, but ignores the hundreds of terroristic crimes by Arabs.

S. WHITMAN  
Los Angeles, California

Dear Sirs:

Sidney Lens should not have wondered so much about the invitation to attend the anti-Zionist symposium in Kuwait with all expenses paid, as he obviously is known as an advocate of the policy of the Palestine Liberation Organization. He learned that the two student groups sponsoring the event considered themselves revolutionary. He also must have known that the Nation-

al Socialist German Workers' Party of Hitler (NSDAP), whose goal it was to liberate Germany and other lands including Palestine from the Jews, was also revolutionary.

Nevertheless he accepted the invitation. He empathizes with the six million Jews killed by Hitler, but he does not empathize with the two and a half million survivors who established a Jewish State which they call Zion and in which live Jews are welcomed as citizens.

He quotes Golda Meir's statement that the Jewish homeland could give refuge to millions of Jews from the pogromist neo-Stalinist Russia and wonders why Israel can't repatriate only one million Arabs. "No Zionist has ever explained that to my satisfaction," he points out with an air of righteousness. Well, I think I can explain it to him.

These Palestinian Arabs have no desire to be repatriated. They could then no longer claim to have been expelled from their homes. These are people kept in storage comparable to Hitler's irredenta of Austrian and Czechoslovakian German "refugees" who were trained in camps as terrorists, as the Austrian and Sudetenland Legion, to prepare the ground for the coming German invasion.

Lens warns the Jews that the Middle Eastern revolution is as inexorable and as inevitable as the one in Southeast Asia and that "a Zionist Israel can hardly survive by coming to the defense of the Husseins and the Faisals and the sheikhs." Southeast Asia is a testing area for modern weaponry as Spain was prior to World War II. Diverting the Arab revolution into a war against the Jews inevitably will trigger World War III in which the Jews will represent the smallest number of those to be exterminated.

ERNEST A. RAPPAPORT, M.D.  
Chicago, Illinois

## No Faith in Ballot

Dear Sirs:

Your editorial statement on Page five of the June, 1971, issue that the war will end when Nixon and those who agree with him are turned out of office, seems overly optimistic. On three occasions the voters have informed candidates for the Presidency that the war must end. In 1964, Goldwater's biggest issue was to escalate the war, which Johnson promised not to do. Goldwater was given a resounding defeat, and Johnson promptly escalated the war.

In the 1968 primaries, the vote was so

strongly against the war that Johnson decided to retire. The Democrats, not being democrats, nominated a man whose position was that Johnson had been right; the Republican candidate had a plan to end the war. The voters bought that secret plan, whereupon Nixon invented a silent, nonvoting majority that wanted him to win, not end, the war.

It is no surprise to me that the generation whose lives, fortunes, and sacred honor are involved have no faith in the ballot, when our Presidents have adopted a political philosophy which can be summed up in three expressions: "*d'etat, c'est moi*;" "the public be damned;" and "this is 1984."

FRANCES FRENCH  
Baltimore, Maryland

## The Real Peril Within

Dear Sirs:

Attorney General John Mitchell says our nation faces "peril from within." Truer words were never spoken. Poverty, economic royalism, militarism, power politics, racism, religious bigotry and hypocrisy, crime, hate, and fear are tearing our great nation apart. But I don't think the Attorney General was referring to these perils. He was referring to the "political subversives" who would seek to change all of this: those "radical-liberals," no doubt, who would do away with the corrupting influences that have grown rank in our system of society, the malignancies representing the real peril from within.

It is ironic that our Cold War against the "Red peril" without should have triggered the radical demands for change that John Mitchell now refers to as the "peril from within." The long suffering American people could tolerate domination, exploitation, poverty, political and economic manipulation, and the many other inherent evils of full-blown capitalism, for themselves, but the ruthless and wanton slaughter of millions of innocent peasants at the hands of American imperialism and in the name of American democracy was the straw that broke the camel's back.

The Vietnam war was our undoing. There can be no turning back now. We have reached the point of no return, from which we can only go forward to a new and better America; a country free of the corrupting influences dragging us down today. All power to the people.

REYNOLDS MOODY  
Lieutenant Colonel (Retired)  
U.S. Marine Corps  
Miami, Florida



# BOOKS



## Chester Bowles: Ahead of His Time

by DAVID C. WILLIAMS

CHESTER BOWLES' modest account of three decades of public service reminds one how much America owes to this able and dedicated man, and how much more he might have contributed had he been given the chance.

Bowles has served in a wide range of responsible posts: head of the Office of Price Administration in World War II; Governor of Connecticut; Congressman from the same state; Under Secretary of State; and twice as Ambassador to India.

In each of these capacities he made a distinctive and substantial contribution. He demonstrated—something to remember in today's ongoing debate—that wage and price controls, ably administered, *can* be effective. As Governor, he was well ahead of his time, but the initiatives he took bore fruit in later years. As a Congressman, he helped to found the Democratic Study Group, which to this day makes liberal Democrats in the House more effective than they would be as individuals. As Ambassador to India, he early grasped the central importance of agriculture there and planted the seeds for what later blossomed as the "green revolution"—a revolution with every prospect of making India self-sufficient in grain. As Under Secretary

of State, he was principally responsible for the appointment of the most brilliant array of ambassadors who have represented this country.

Yet, in retrospect, the overriding impression of the years covered in *Promises to Keep* is that of a tragically missed opportunity. After eight years of drift under President Eisenhower, the United States in 1961 could have opened a new era in world affairs. Despite Bowles' earnest, almost desperate efforts, that opportunity was not grasped.

There are some observers—and not only economic determinists—who regard America's involvement in Vietnam as inevitable. In Bowles' account of the first crucial months of the Kennedy Administration, however, the element of human fallibility comes through strongly. There was the inexperienced young President, elected by the barest of majorities, looking to Establishment figures for the prestige

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PROMISES TO KEEP: MY YEARS IN PUBLIC LIFE, 1941-1969, by Chester Bowles. Harper & Row. 657 pp. \$12.95.

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he felt he needed and lacked. There were the great Cold War bureaucracies (the Pentagon, the State Department, the C.I.A.), dedicated to doing what came naturally to them—only perhaps with more "vigor," in an Administration that seemed to prize action for action's sake. And there were the intellectuals brought into the Government, relishing the novel taste of power, determined to show that they were not woolly-minded sentimentalists, but "tough-minded" realists in word and deed.

It was this whole fatal combination which led within three months to the Bay of Pigs. It was a disaster from which the Administration never quite recovered. Kennedy's humiliation over Cuba seems to have given Khrushchev the idea that he could, at Vienna, be bluffed and bullied. The consequences are still with us. As Bowles writes:

"When I had discussed American policy in regard to South Vietnam with Kennedy shortly after his election, he expressed only a marginal interest. But following the Bay of Pigs, his confrontation with Khrushchev in Vienna and the resumption of nuclear testing by the Soviets, I sensed that, subconsciously at least, he was searching for some issue on which he could prove at relatively low cost that he was, in fact, a tough President who could not be pushed around by the Soviets, the Chinese, or anyone else."

We know all too well how high that "relatively low cost" turned out to be. To his great credit, Bowles fought this and other disastrous policies every inch of the way. It was for this reason, rather than his undoubted tendency to talk at length and draft memoranda at even greater length, that he was relegated to the sidelines after a few short months.

Generous always, Bowles is meticulous in recording the fact that some of the Administration's early hawks—Robert Kennedy, Robert McNamara, possibly the President himself—had come to have sober second thoughts. But it must in all conscience be said that the Presidency is one post in which the price of "learning on the job" is too high to afford.

Moreover, it seems that the same lessons have to be learned over and over again. Despite his years of experi-



ence—or perhaps because that experience was limited mainly to domestic affairs—Lyndon Johnson was as unprepared in his way to be President as John Kennedy had been in a different way. And a year ago President Nixon launched the Cambodian incursion to prove that the United States is not a “pitiful, helpless giant,” just as if the disasters of his predecessors had taught him nothing.

Perhaps it is the lack of fixed principles in some of our leaders—the pervasive “pragmatism”—that has done the most damage. As Bowles perceptively observes: “Anyone in public life who has strong convictions about the rights and wrongs of public morality, both domestic and international, has a very great advantage in times of strain, as his instincts on what to do are clear and immediate.”

In the absence of the application of clear principles, as Bowles points out, problems are analyzed and discussed endlessly, and issues small enough to deal with in the beginning tend to get out of hand. And even if the pragmatist may come out right in the end so long as he keeps his head, Bowles warns: “What worries me are the conclusions that such an individual may reach when he is tired, angry, frustrated, or emotionally affected.”

If people knew how they were governed, a wise Englishman observed, they would not sleep of nights. Chester Bowles’ reminiscences are no remedy for insomnia. But, as liberals and intellectuals look forward to another chance at power, this book should be required reading. Indeed, any citizen concerned about the future of his country would do well to read and ponder what Bowles has distilled out of his deep feelings and wide experience.

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## THE REVIEWERS

DAVID C. WILLIAMS, a specialist in foreign affairs, served for six years in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. PHILIP G. ALTBACH, associate professor of educational policy studies at the University of Wisconsin, is co-editor, with Seymour Martin Lipset, of “Students in Revolt.” MEL PHILLIPS, inmate librarian at the Missouri state penitentiary, is serving a ten-year sentence.

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# Vanguard of Campus Protest

by PHILIP G. ALTBACH

THE San Francisco Bay Area, we are told, is the crucible of the modern American revolution. In the vanguard of the revolution is the student movement. The books under review here deal with the various campus crises at the University of California in Berkeley and San Francisco State College and their effects on the institutions and students involved. Student movements at the two schools have been crucial to the development of the art of confrontation politics in the United States. The “Berkeley student revolt” of 1964 was the first of the major student agitations which convulsed the campuses in the late 1960s. The events at San Francisco State College are somewhat less well known, but are important nevertheless. The 1968-69 crisis at San Francisco State involved a large number of arrests, the largest strike by professors in recent years in the United States, and the rise to power of S. I. Hayakawa as president of the college. Significantly, San Francisco State was the home of the first Black Students’ Union, a movement which spread to other campuses quickly and had major educational and political results.

The books under review also represent a new genre in the literature on student protest and the campus crisis: the case study. All of the books attempt to describe and analyze the campus events at Berkeley or San Francisco State from various points of view. Academic administrators and others concerned with the operations of universities during crises will be well advised to peruse these volumes. Indeed, the complexity of a campus crisis becomes clear in these analyses in a way which is not possible from press or television accounts. Readers will be surprised at the many forces at work in any campus crisis—police, student radicals, factions within the faculty, administrators, and even the mass media.

Berkeley, in the last analysis, is the

more important of the two crises. It was the first major campus disruption and provided an impetus and a model for many of the others which followed. In addition, the University of California at Berkeley is the very model of the “multiversity” (it is the place which Clark Kerr, former president of the University of California, had in mind when he coined the term in 1963), and therefore has major institutional implications for other American universities.

The literature on the Berkeley situation now fills a small bookshelf. Two recent books—Max Heirich’s *The Beginning: Berkeley, 1964* and C. Michael Otten’s *University Authority and the Student: The Berkeley Experience*—are probably the best written ones to date and are first class scholarly studies as well. They are two of the best books published in recent years on any university crisis, and I believe they will provide a model for future research and writing on academic institutions. They are well worthwhile for anyone interested in the dynamics of American higher education.

Heirich, now a sociologist at the

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THE BEGINNING: BERKELEY, 1964, by Max Heirich. Columbia University Press. 317 pp. \$6.95.

UNIVERSITY AUTHORITY AND THE STUDENT: THE BERKELEY EXPERIENCE, by C. Michael Otten. University of California Press. 222 pp. \$7.50.

PRESIDENT SEVEN, by John Summerhill. World. 233 pp. \$7.95.

ACADEMICS ON THE LINE, by Arlene Kaplan Daniels, Rachel Kahn-hut, and Associates. Jossey-Bass. 269 pp. \$8.50.

BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY, by Robert Smith, Richard Axen, and DeVere Pentony. Jossey-Bass. 367 pp. \$10.

BLOW IT UP! by Dikran Karagueuzian. Gambit. 196 pp. \$5.95.

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University of Michigan, was a graduate student at Berkeley during the events of 1964. *The Beginning* is a study of the 1964 crisis and its causes and ramifications; a longer version of the book entitled *The Spiral of Conflict: Berkeley, 1964* includes a wealth of methodological information. Heirich analyzes in detail the Free Speech Movement and the issues which surrounded the original confrontation. Perhaps the most interesting part of *The Beginning* is Heirich's consideration of the role of the university administration, headed at that time by Clark Kerr, and the Berkeley faculty. Behind the situation on the campus lurked the state authorities. Heirich points out that one of the big "busts" at Berkeley was ordered directly by then-Governor Pat Brown over the objection of the university administration, which had reached a tentative settlement with student protest leaders.

University crises do not take place in a vacuum, and the Otten book amply documents this fact. This volume is an especially useful addition to the literature on student protest because it considers the relations between the University of California and its students over a period of nearly a century. Otten points out that the traditional relationships between universities and their students were designed for small institutions in periods of social peace. The American notion of *in loco parentis*—the idea that the university should act as a parent for its students—was developed in quieter times. The great period of growth in higher education, Otten points out, ushered in an entirely new equation on the campus. After World War II, the numbers of students increased dramatically, and their age also rose. Academic institutions developed bureaucracies to deal with student affairs, at the same time that the students themselves were rejecting many of the assumptions on which discipline was based. With the growth of political consciousness in the early 1960s, the stage was set for confrontation over the many orthodox campus rules and regulations.

Both the Heirich and Otten books indicate that large public universities operate under a tremendous number

of pressures and constraints which make rational decision-making next to impossible. The large numbers of students on a single campus and the growth of diverse subcultures among them provide one major pressure. Government involvement in academic affairs and a many-layered bureaucratic university structure tie the hands of those who wish to resolve crises. The faculty, it is clear, has not been an effective mediator. While no clear answer emerges, the problems of the large and prestigious universities are analyzed effectively in these two books.

San Francisco State College is a unique institution and the books dealing with its crisis are also unique. The books under consideration here (there are several more, including Kay Boyle's *The Long Walk at San Francisco State*) are the reminiscences of the most liberal of the three presidents who tried to administer the college during its travail, psychologist John Summerskill (*President Seven*); a collection of essays by activists in the militant American Federation of Teachers local at the college (*Academics on the Line*); a fairly balanced account of the crisis by three "establishment liberals" in the administration, including Summerskill's successor, Robert Smith (*By Any Means Necessary*); and a descriptive account by a former student editor of the *Daily Gater*, Dikran Karagueuzian (*Blow It Up!*).

These books provide an interesting contrast, for each one presents a different perspective. Even after a careful reading of all four books, the sequence and nature of the events at San Francisco State are not entirely clear.

Probably the best single volume in terms of explaining what happened is *By Any Means Necessary*, by former President Robert Smith, Richard Axen, and De Vere Pentony. They also present an inside perspective of the faculty and administration reaction to the crisis.

*Academics on the Line*, by Arlene Kaplan Daniels, Rachel Kahn-hut, and their activist associates, is a radical critique of the crisis, with strong at-

tacks on both S. I. Hayakawa and the college administration. The book, unfortunately, is rather unevenly written and provides only a fragmentary account of the events.

*Blow It Up!* by the student editor of the *Gater* during the crisis, is the least satisfying in terms of its analysis of the events, but Dikran Karagueuzian does provide some fascinating descriptive accounts of some of the most dramatic aspects of the crisis.

The most puzzling of the volumes, John Summerskill's *President Seven*, provides a personal account of his year or so at the helm of the college. Summerskill was criticized during the crisis for his indecisiveness and if this book is indicative, one can understand why. He comes across as a sincere individual, but one caught in the winds of a crisis which he could not handle and in which many of the key decisions were made from above. His dramatic resignation and departure from the campus for Ethiopia on a day's notice must certainly be a classic incident in American academic history.

What do these books tell us? First of all, they clearly indicate that what seem to be simple acts of disruption by militant students have deeper causes and wide ranging results. They indicate the complexity of academic decision-making. They demonstrate that public higher education during the early period of the Reagan administration was caught in the crossfire of broader political struggles in the state.

It is curious, and perhaps significant, that at the institution more open to change, San Francisco State, with its nationally known Experimental College and early commitment to minority group studies, consensus was impossible to reach, and neither radicals nor conservatives felt that the innovations which had been developed at the college were worth much. At both Berkeley and San Francisco State the academic administrators did not act with the kind of imagination which might have solved the crises without major confrontation—and it is clear that both crises were soluble. In both cases, off-campus forces helped to force the issue and made matters considerably worse.

While much can be learned from



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these books, their lesson is not a pleasant one for the future of American higher education. U.S. colleges and universities are subject to many pressures, and it is clear that political forces on and off the campuses will exploit crises for their own ends. Academic governance has been unable to solve its own problems, and the consensus which once kept the campuses calm no longer exists at many schools. Perhaps most disheartening, the academic community seems to have learned little from the crises of the past six years. If those concerned with—and about—higher education would read books such as these, they might be able to help the universities create the means for solving some of their problems.

## Convicts Speak Up

INSIDE: PRISON AMERICAN STYLE,  
edited by Robert J. Minton, Jr. Random House. 325 pp. \$7.95.

Reviewed by

Mel Phillips

"IN ORDER to know what our prisons are like, we must be in them or listen to the men and women who are."

Those words are part of Robert Minton's introduction to *Inside: Prison American Style*, a collection of uncensored writings by convicts confined in California and representative, I believe, of most prisons in America. Minton, who bears the unlikely label of "specialist-authority" in penology, entered the California penal system as an outsider and for two years worked with inmates at San Quentin and Soledad in developing group discussion programs. Through his skillful editing, Minton lets the convicts speak for themselves—and speak they do. Their forceful writing and perceptive analysis disclose a "system" that engulfs thousands of humans in a steel cocoon of abnormality, perversion, cruelty, violence, and petty bureaucracy, from which they cannot extract themselves, except through years of servitude.

The writing in *Inside* will offend, if

for no other reason than the language. It is shocking and meant to be just that, in the hope, faint though it may be, that the shock value may create a public awareness that will lead to the use of new concepts of penology.

Presumably the hard writing in *Inside* was smuggled out of prison by Minton, for he uses pseudonyms to protect the writers, many of whom are in prison or on parole, from harassment and punishment. The articulate convicts have produced a forthright indictment of California's penal system, which, paradoxically, is considered one of the best in America; one is left to wonder just how bad this country's other penal systems are. It should be noted that although California is the most populous state, its penal roster of some 30,000 men is disproportionately large, close to fifteen per cent of the total U.S. prison population.

This disturbing collection of convict essays, prose, and poetry does not involve the proverbial and petty issues of grievance generally heard by the public. Instead it digs deeply into the true problems that exist in the cold and hard world of prison reality: survival, race riots, homosexuality, library facilities, indeterminate sentences, parole board practices, and institutional punishment.

The book effectively exposes the bureaucracy of the California system which produces failure through systematic perpetuation of an archaic concept of penology, one that destroys the convict as a human being and reduces him to a mindless animal who must be caged, so it is said, "for the protection of self and society."

Of prime concern to the California convict, and directly related to the parole board, is the indeterminate sentence. In theory it sounds progressive; in practice, consider the words of convict Walter Burckhard:

"With fairly benevolent beginnings, it works like this: The judge sentences you to the state prison. Say you sold marijuana, the sentence is from five years to life. This means that the very least time you will spend in prison and on parole is five years, the most, forever. This is called the indeterminate sentence. This method is supposed to rehabilitate men. If you were sen-



tenced to three years, no more, no less, you would know when you will leave."

The indeterminate sentence is too often administered by the parole board in an arbitrary and summary manner, without any system of checks and balances of a judicial nature. There is frequent abuse of this type of sentence, which is the root of much of the despair convicts endure, and a major cause of the "unrest" which leads to prison strikes and race riots.

*Inside* details the case of one convict with a small sentence who was denied parole nine times in nine years. The book includes a complete transcript of a parole board hearing which clearly reveals the mentality of the board members. The board gave no reason or explanation to the convict for the denial of parole; it did not suggest any steps of constructive self-improvement it would like to see accomplished before the convict could be favorably considered for parole.

What does a convict do with literally hundreds of thousands of hours spent in prison? A few write, draw, or paint. Some listen to the radio or watch television to the point of exhaustion. Others join in "bull" sessions. Most convicts spend considerable time reading, both for relaxation and knowledge, if a prison library is available and properly maintained.

Twelve pages of *Inside* are devoted to a report of a "Saturday Morning Study Group." These convicts conducted a seven-weeks study of the library in one prison. They found it inefficiently run and not serving the varied needs of the prisoners. Seventeen thousand books were listed in stock, but only 3,000 were on the shelves. Of these available books, most were outdated. The study, including constructive recommendations, was turned over to the prison administration for remedial action. It was ignored.

*Inside: Prison American Style* should not be ignored. The public and public officials should read the disclosures as a first step in determining the penal reform measures most urgently needed for the sake of prison inmates and society.

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